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The COVID-19 pandemic blighted all aspects of American life,
but people in jails, prisons, and other detention sites experienced
singular harm and neglect. Housing vulnerable detainee populations
with elevated medical needs, these facilities were ticking time bombs.
They were overcrowded, underfunded, unsanitary, insufficiently
ventilated, and failed to meet even minimum health-and-safety
standards. Every unit of national and sub-national government failed
to prevent detainee communities from becoming pandemic epicenters,
and judges were no exception.
This Article takes a comprehensive look at the decisional law
growing out of COVID-19 detainee litigation and situates the judicial
response as part of a comprehensive institutional failure. We read
hundreds of COVID-19 custody cases, and our analysis classifies the
decision-making by reference to three attributes: the form of detention
at issue, the substantive right asserted, and the remedy sought. Several
patterns emerged. Judges avoided constitutional holdings whenever
they could, rejected requests for ongoing supervision, and resisted
collective discharge—limiting such relief to vulnerable
subpopulations. The most successful litigants were detainees in
custody pending immigration proceedings, and the least successful
were those convicted of crimes.
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We draw three conclusions that bear on subsequent pandemic
responses, including vaccination efforts, and on incarceration more
generally. First, courts avoided robust relief by recalibrating rights
and remedies, particularly those relating to the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Second, court intervention was especially limited by the
behavior of bureaucracies responsible for the detention function.
Third, the judicial activity reflected entrenched assumptions about the
danger and moral worth of prisoners that are widespread but difficult
to defend. Before the judiciary can effectively respond to the dangers
posed by a pandemic, nonjudicial institutions will have to tolerate
large-scale, exigency-driven releases from custody, and judges will
have to overcome their empirically dubious resistance to
decarceration.
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INTRODUCTION
The coronavirus-19 pandemic (COVID-19) wrecked, at least for a time,
virtually every feature of American life. Everyone bears some pandemic burden,
but the public health costs are distributed in ways that reflect and amplify
existing inequalities. During the pandemic, the communities that lost
institutional contests for health-protective resources were already structurally
disadvantaged. 1 There was, however, one American community whose
experience of neglect and harm was almost singular: people in government
custody. 2
COVID-19 poses a unique threat to people in jails, prisons, and other
detention sites. 3 During the early stages of the pandemic, persons held in custody
were 5.5 times more likely than other people to be infected with COVID-19 and
3 times more likely to die from infection. 4 COVID-19 began to tear through
1. See generally Seth A. Berkowitz, Crystal Wiley Cené & Avik Chatterjee, Covid-19 and
Health Equity—Time to Think Big, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. e76(1) (2020) (linking adverse COVID-19
outcomes to structural discrimination and disadvantage); COVID-19 Racial and Ethnic Health
Disparities, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/health-equity/racial-ethnic-disparities/index.html
[https://perma.cc/4N6U-JTG7]
(providing overview of health equity considerations).
2. Norms about terminology appropriate for this space are shifting. Virtually all concise terms
for people in detention are essentializing, and many are stigmatizing (e.g., “inmate”). We do our best to
refer simply to “people” in custody, but we will sometimes use the word “detainee” when there is a tight
nexus between a proposition and the person’s state of detention, and where the less essentializing term
compromises meaning and/or clarity. Less frequently, we will use the word “prisoner” and do so
primarily in contexts where that word operates in conjunction with others to convey an established
meaning—such as “prisoner litigation” or “prisoner release order.”
3. There is already some early, shorter-form work from the legal academy on COVID-19
litigation against detention sites. See, e.g., Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of Covid-19,
115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 59 (2020) (scrutinizing the effects of COVID-19 on pretrial detention);
Sharon Dolovich, Mass Incarceration, Meet Covid-19, 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 4 (2020)
[hereinafter Dolovich, Mass Incarceration, Meet Covid-19] (identifying COVID-19 detainee mitigation
efforts and analyzing broad failures); Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Criminal Procedure PostCOVID, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 19, 2020), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/constitutionalcriminal-procedure-post-covid/ [https://perma.cc/2A4W-MMUB] (providing an overview of COVID19 litigation against correctional institutions); Lee Kovarsky, Pandemics, Risks, and Remedies, 106 VA.
L. REV. ONLINE 71 (2020) (exploring the inability of institutions to adequately facilitate release). None
of this work, however, analyzes the COVID-19 detention decisions comprehensively, across multiple
custody categories.
4. See Brendan Saloner, Kalind Parish, Julie A. Ward, Grace DiLaura & Sharon Dolovich,
COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Federal and State Prisons, 324 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 602, 602–03 (2020).
For further discussion of the statistic, see Benjamin A. Barsky, Eric Reinhart, Paul Farmer & Salmaan
Keshavjee, Vaccination Plus Decarceration — Stopping Covid-19 in Jails and Prisons, 384 NEW ENG.
J. MED 1583, 1584 (2021).
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detention communities as soon as it reached the United States—jails and prisons
quickly became viral epicenters. 5 The heightened rates of mortality and infection
are products of several combined problems. The virus is transmitted more easily
in confined spaces, 6 and perhaps no space contains a fixed population less
capable of dispersing than a detention facility. 7 American detention sites,
moreover, have long lacked adequate ventilation, sanitation, and healthcare. 8
Persons serving criminal sentences are older, are more likely to have preexisting
conditions, and are more likely to have complex medical needs. 9 As of this
writing, COVID-19 has infected over 439,000 persons in correctional custody,
and, including staff, about 2,900 have died. 10
Every outbreak at a detention center is a public health crisis; together, they
represent a national catastrophe that forced judges to consider the healthprotective rights of detainees during emergencies. The results were not
encouraging. Despite right-remedy combinations capable of reducing viral
transmission and mortality, 11 judicial intervention was quite scarce, too slow,
and extremely deferential. 12 The decisional law captures what one might call a
viral injustice, by which we mean an institutional equilibrium that avoids other
social costs by saddling vulnerable detainees and adjacent staff with pandemic
risk. What stands out is not just the judiciary’s minimalist posture but also its
second-classing of rights and remedies that might have softened the pandemic’s
impact—preventing its spread within detention facilities, among staff, and to
surrounding communities.
The marginalization of detainee rights during the pandemic started at the
top and trickled down. Compare the Supreme Court’s treatment of such rights
(which would likely save lives) with its treatment of the rights to religious
practice and expression (which may place people at risk). For example, in Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 13 the Court disabled a New York
provision, enacted during the height of the pandemic, that limited occupancy for
a category of gatherings that included religious services. 14 In so many words, the
Justices emphasized that even the pandemic emergency must not override the
5. See Dolovich, Mass Incarceration, Meet Covid-19, supra note 3, at 4; Clark Neily,
Decarceration in the Face of a Pandemic, CATO INST. AT LIBERTY (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.cato.org/blog/decarceration-face-pandemic [https://perma.cc/P7BM-NSE6].
6. See
COVID-19:
Frequently
Asked
Questions
(Oct.
21,
2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/faq.html#Coronavirus-Disease-2019-Basics
[https://perma.cc/CD4P-TXRU].
7. See Kovarsky, supra note 3, at 74; Dolovich, Mass Incarceration, Meet Covid-19, supra
note 3, at 8.
8. See Neily, supra note 5.
9. See Kovarsky, supra note 3, at 74.
10. See COVID PRISON PROJECT (last visited Nov. 30, 2021), https://covidprisonproject.com.
11. See infra Section I.B for an explanation of available doctrine.
12. See infra Part II.
13. 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020).
14. More precisely, the Supreme Court stayed enforcement of the provision pending disposition
on appeal. See id. at 65.
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thick bundle of American rights to religious association: “Members of this Court
are not public health experts, and we should respect the judgment of those with
special expertise and responsibility in this area. But even in a pandemic, the
Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten.” 15 Suffice it to say that the Court
resolved the rights-versus-safety question very differently in the detention
context. There were some early cases in which lower courts issued injunctions
designed to curb the spread of the pandemic at certain detention sites. 16 The
Court, however, twice intervened, using so-called “shadow docket” orders to
countermand the intervention of lower federal judges—despite detailed lowercourt factfinding concluding that some preliminary relief was necessary to
prevent irreparable harm to the lives and health of detainees. 17 The message was
clear: the Court would enforce deference to the public-health-and-safety
decisions of detention officials.
This Article is, to our knowledge, the first to comprehensively map the
judicial response to the pandemic’s effect on persons in custody. In Part I, we
set forth the health-and-safety challenges that the pandemic posed for detention
facilities, as well as the preexisting legal framework for the responsive detainee
litigation. In the process, we sketch the public health crisis unfolding at
American detention sites—itself a story of incompetence, indifference, and lax
regulation. 18 There are, in our view, three meaningful classifications necessary
to map the responsive decisional law: (1) the type of custody or form of detention
at issue; 19 (2) the substance of the health-protective right asserted; 20 and (3)
features of the remedy sought. 21

15. Id. at 68.
16. See, e.g., Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, 694–95 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (granting
preliminary injunction against Orange County jail in California), preliminary injunction eventually
overturned, 140 S. Ct. 2620 (2020); Valentine v. Collier, 2020 WL 5797881, at *37–*38 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 29, 2020) (granting permanent injunction against Texas geriatric unit for people convicted of
crimes), rev’d, 978 F.3d 154, 158 (5th Cir. 2020); Mays v. Dart, 456 F. Supp. 3d 966, 1017 (N.D. Ill.)
(granting preliminary injunction to improve conditions in Chicago’s Cook County jail), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, rev’d in part, 974 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 2020).
17. See Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. at 2620; see also id. at 2621 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Williams
v. Wilson, 207 L. Ed. 2d 168, 168 (June 4, 2020). Both were “shadow docket” orders, issued without
oral argument and without a signed “opinion of the court.” See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme
Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 3–5 (2015) (coining “shadow docket” as a term).
Regarding the growth in the use and the divisiveness of shadow docket rulings, see Steve Vladeck,
Symposium: The Solicitor General, the Shadow Docket and the Kennedy Effect, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct.
22, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/symposium-the-solicitor-general-the-shadow-docketand-the-kennedy-effect/ [https://perma.cc/2YDB-5VXF].
18. See infra Section I.A. For an important overview from a public health perspective, see
NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., DECARCERATING CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES DURING
COVID-19: ADVANCING HEALTH, EQUITY, AND SAFETY 26–28 (Emily A. Wang, Bruce Western,
Emily P. Backes & Julie Schuck eds., 2020) [hereinafter 2020 NAS REPORT].
19. See infra Section I.B.1.
20. See infra Section I.B.2.
21. See infra Section I.B.3.
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In Part II, we map the COVID-19 litigation, relying on the classification
scheme developed in Part I. For cases in which litigants sought release from
detention, courts avoided collective remedies and ducked constitutional
questions where non-constitutional grounds for discharge were available. 22 They
strayed from these principles of avoidance and granted relief primarily in cases
where custody was auxiliary to some immigration proceeding—from the
perspective of those in custody, perhaps the lone bright spot in COVID-19
detention litigation. 23 For cases in which litigants sought changed conditions, the
guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) became a
de facto (and problematic) standard of care, in part both because that guidance
was highly informal and because it downplayed the fact that correctional
facilities needed to reduce overcrowding in order to permit adequate social
distancing. 24
In Part III, we draw three conclusions from the COVID-19 detainee
litigation. First, in order to avoid what they perceived to be extravagant relief,
courts narrowed remedial and substantive doctrine. 25 Second, efficacious
judicial action was unusually dependent on underwhelming bureaucratic
initiative and cooperation. 26 Third, the under-enforcement of health-protective
rights seemed to reflect dated ideas about the danger and moral worth of people
in government custody. 27 Collectively, these three conclusions suggest a broader
inference about the institutional competence of judges: in addition to any
shortage of will, they lack the statutory tools and the bureaucratic partners to deal
effectively with pandemic risk. These are troubling conclusions about the quality
and institutional potential of judging, and they have significant implications for
detainee vaccination and post-pandemic release programs.
Our objective is to describe what happened when judges had to adjudicate
detainees’ rights to health and safety in the crucible of emergency—and to draw
conclusions at a useful level of generality. We did not code the decisional law
and so conducted no statistical analysis. 28 The body of decisions is nonetheless
large enough, and sufficiently populated with opinions from influential courts,
that there are already meaningful things to say about the behavior of judges
during the pandemic. We do not mean to suggest that inadequate protection of
22. See infra Sections II.A.1 & II.A.2.
23. See infra Section II.A.3.
24. See infra Section II.B. For an excellent critique of the CDC standards and the role that they
played in litigation, see Developments in the Law, Conditions of Confinement, COVID-19, and the
CDC, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2233 (2021).
25. See infra Section III.A.
26. See infra Section III.B.
27. See infra Section III.C.
28. For many reasons, the decision set would have been unsuited for such analysis. As one
example, early opinions in the set would have influenced later ones. As another, there would be problems
weighting decisions that applied to very different numbers of people. We, therefore, avoid false
precision. Instead, this project is designed to, among other things, help identify the pockets of
institutional activity that warrant more quantitative analysis.
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detention communities is solely or primarily the judiciary’s fault. There is more
than enough institutional blame to go around, and there was little political will
to manage risks on behalf of unpopular constituencies. Our point is that judges
did not serve as a backstop to protect persons held in custody and that trial judges
who tried were largely superseded by appellate courts. 29
I.
COVID-19 AS A NEW LEGAL CHALLENGE
Part I provides background and sets forth a basic framework for thinking
about the judicial response to COVID-19 in American detention facilities.
Judicial decision-making hinged on three questions: (1) the type of custody
exercised over the people seeking relief; 30 (2) the nature of the underlying healthprotective right; 31 and (3) the remedy sought. 32 We do not claim that every case
can be neatly plotted using these three attributes, but simply that these are crucial
concepts for understanding the pertinent judicial behavior.
A. COVID-19 in Detention Facilities
The pandemic’s disproportionate effect on detention communities is
partially a story about the unique vulnerability of those populations and partially
a story about the flat-footed response of officials with health-related obligations
thereto. When we refer to “sites of detention,” we are describing facilities that
house the following detainee categories: people in prisons and jails who have
been convicted of crimes (criminal detention); people in non-criminal custody,
who have been jailed and are awaiting criminal process (pretrial detention);
people in non-criminal custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
auxiliary to an immigration proceeding (immigration detention); and other
people in non-criminal custody auxiliary to some other civil process, such as a
those designated for a juvenile or a mandatory substance abuse program. A
“correctional facility” is a detention site related to criminal process—that is, it is
a prison or jail that houses those awaiting criminal trial or convicted of crimes. 33

29. See Sharon Dolovich, The Failed Regulation and Oversight of American Prisons, 5
ANNUAL REV. OF CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter Dolovich, The Failed Regulation and
Oversight of American Prisons] (manuscript at 5.16), annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurevcriminol-011518-024445 [https://perma.cc/6L3A-5YF6] (“The almost uniform refusal of the federal
judiciary to respond to urgent appeals for broad constitutional relief during the pandemic despite
demonstrable elevated risk posed to the incarcerated by COVID powerfully illustrates just how little
meaningful constitutional protection for people in custody the federal courts are prepared to provide.”
(internal citations omitted)); cf. id. (manuscript at 5.4) (explaining that, in “a well-functioning system,
the courts would provide a backstop to legislative or executive failure”).
30. See infra Section I.B.1.
31. See infra Section I.B.2.
32. See infra Section I.B.3.
33. See
Corrections,
BUREAU
OF
JUST.
STAT.
(Feb.
18,
2021),
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=1#terms_def [https://perma.cc/8873-PY2S].
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1. Vulnerable Detention Communities
Mass incarceration has created a “perfect breeding ground for the virus.” 34
As of 2020, there were approximately 2.3 million people detained under color of
law, including people in 1,943 state and federal prisons, 3,134 local jails, 1,772
juvenile correctional facilities, 218 immigration detention facilities, and some
unknown number of Indian Country jails, as well as various other military
prisons, civil commitment facilities, government psychiatric centers, and
territorial prisons. 35 People detained in jails and immigration detention centers
tend to have short stays—creating substantial turnover and a different set of
health threats—while people in prison tend to serve longer sentences for more
serious crimes. 36 In what follows, we detail the health vulnerabilities of these
different detainee categories.
People in prison—mostly the non-jail population convicted of crimes—are
people with vulnerable health profiles, even setting aside that they live in
dangerous confinement. As of 2020, there were approximately 1,466,000 people
in state and federal prison. 37 Many are older because they are serving longer
sentences. 38 This graying detainee cohort has chronic health problems, elevated
mental health needs, and substantially impaired mobility. 39 Many entered prison
34. Editorial Bd., America is Letting the Coronavirus Rage Through Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
21,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/21/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-prisons-jails.html
[https://perma.cc/E3G7-A2RH]; see also Dolovich, Mass Incarceration, Meet Covid-19, supra note 3,
at 4 (“From the earliest days of the pandemic, it was clear that [COVID-19] posed an outsized danger
to the more than two million people locked inside America’s prisons and jails.”).
35. See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html
[https://perma.cc/J28G-PDRW].
36. Prisons generally contain people convicted and serving longer sentences for more serious
crimes. See DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST, NCJ 252205, TIME
SERVED IN STATE PRISON, 2016 (2018), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2CAG-YM36]. Jails generally contain those awaiting trial or serving short criminal
sentences. See ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 253044, JAIL INMATES IN
2018, at 1 (2020), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji18.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AAJ-V68Z]. People in
the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) were there for an average of 55 days,
although there is substantial variability based on circumstances. See AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL,
IMMIGRATION
DETENTION
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
BY
AGENCY
(2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/immigration_detention_in_th
e_united_states_by_agency.pdf [https://perma.cc/8389-2DTR].
37. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 253516,
PRISONERS IN 2018, at 1 (2020), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/p18.pdf [https://perma.cc/LV697GCS].
38. See Meredith Booker, BJS Data Shows Graying of Prisons, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May
19,
2016),
https://www.prisonpolicy.
org/blog/2016/05/19/bjsaging/ [https://perma.cc/J4E5-E4W8] (discussing “boom” in elderly prison
population); Emily Widra, Since You Asked: How Many People Aged 55 or Older Are in Prison, by
State?,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(May
11,
2020),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/05/11/55plus/ [https://perma.cc/9WFE-UHYM] (providing
state-by-state data).
39. See Kimberly A. Skarupski, Alden Gross, Jennifer A. Schrack, Jennifer A. Deal & Gabriel
B. Eber, The Health of America’s Aging Prison Population, 40 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 157, 157 (2018);

2022]

VIRAL INJUSTICE

125

in poor health to begin with, due in no small part to dangerous substance abuse
profiles. 40
Prison infrastructure and its environmental features make health-andsafety-protective practices challenging. Detention facilities are generally
overcrowded, which means that social distancing is difficult or impossible. 41
Dormitories are often double- or triple-bunked, there are not enough bathrooms
and showers, congregate areas are crowded, and detainees are double-celled. 42
The sanitation is bad, adequate cleaning supplies are lacking, problems with
ventilation make airborne pathogens especially dangerous, and many prisons are
ill-equipped to provide adequate health care. 43 These facilities have long been
vulnerable to disease—including hepatitis B and C, HIV/AIDS, and
tuberculosis. 44 Most prisons are in rural areas and far from a hospital, thereby
frustrating access to outside healthcare. 45 Physical restrictions on detainee
movement help only so much, at least in the absence of restrictions on the
movement of staff and visitors. 46
Jails ordinarily house people awaiting trial, as well as people convicted of
less-serious crimes. 47 As of 2020, there were about 631,000 people that states
held in local jails, and another 60,000 in custody of U.S. Marshals. 48 There is far
more detainee turnover in jails than there is in prisons, and the average jail stay
LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, MARCUS BERZOFSKY & JENNIFER UNANGST, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2011–
12, at 23 (2015), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/mpsfpji1112.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8VD-ANBY].
40. See MARUSCHAK ET AL., supra note 39, at 10.
41. See Neily, supra note 7; see also CARSON, supra note 37 (“At year-end 2018, the prison
custody population in 12 states and the BOP was equal to or greater than their prisons’ maximum rated,
operational, and design capacity, and 25 states and the BOP had a total number of prisoners in custody
that met or exceeded their minimum number of beds across the three capacity measures: design,
operational, and rated capacity.”).
42. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 26–28.
43. See id. at 26–27.
44. See id. at 14, 17; see also Rucker C. Johnson & Steven Raphael, The Effects of Male
Incarceration Dynamics on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Infection Rates Among African
American Women and Men, 52 J.L. & ECON. 251 (2009) (describing spread of AIDS in carceral
settings); Kathyrn M. Nowotny, Marisa Omori, Melanie McKenna & Joshua Kleinman, Incarceration
Rates and Incidence of Sexually Transmitted Infections in US Counties, 2011–2016, 110 AM. J. OF PUB.
HEALTH S130 (2020) (same, regarding sexually transmitted infections generally); Anne C. Spaulding &
David L. Thomas, Screening for HCV Infection in Jails, 307 J. AM. MEDICAL ASS’N 1259 (2012) (same,
regarding HCV infection in jails).
45. See generally Tracy Huling, Building a Prison Economy in Rural America, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 197 (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (describing rural location of majority of prisons built since 1980).
46. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 25.
47. See Frequently Asked Questions: What is the Difference Between Jails and Prisons?,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=322 [https://perma.cc/GX8N-XJ26].
48. See Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 35. Categorizing federal custody is more difficult
because of increasing use of local jails to house immigration detainees. See JACOB KANG-BROWN,
OLIVER HINDS, EITAL SCHATTNER-ELMALEH & JAMES WALLACE-LEE, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUST.,
PEOPLE IN JAIL IN 2019, at 2 (2019), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/people-in-jail-in2019.pdf. [https://perma.cc/9ERB-AYLH].
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is less than one month. 49 The reason for greater jail churn is intuitive—pretrial
detention entails shorter stays because the people held there are not serving
criminal sentences, and most return immediately to the community. 50 (About
10.7 million people were admitted to local jails in 2018. 51) Like prisons, many
jails are overcrowded. 52 And, as with people in prisons, people in jails are
disproportionately afflicted with chronic health conditions, have elevated mental
health care needs, and require substance abuse treatment. 53 These underlying
vulnerabilities, population turnover, and visitation patterns combine to transform
jails into “epidemiologic pumps” that spread COVID-19 to surrounding
communities and exacerbate structural health disparities. 54
Jails and prisons are mostly sites of correctional detention, but considerable
government custody involves neither those awaiting trial nor those serving a
criminal sentence. As of 2020, there were some fifty-six thousand noncitizens in
ICE custody, forty-six thousand of whom were held in immigration detention
centers. 55 (The rest are mostly in local jails or private prisons. 56) There were
about forty-four thousand minors in juvenile detention facilities 57 and perhaps
over one million people detained pursuant to civil commitment orders. 58 Of these
non-correctional detainee populations, those in ICE custody are most significant
for our purposes. People that ICE detained at local jails struggled to socially
distance 59 and were naturally subject to any other health-and-safety risks those
facilities created. Facilities specializing in ICE detention experienced rapid
spread of COVID-19, having “long been vulnerable to infectious disease
outbreaks.” 60 These facilities were “tinderboxes” that presented “ideal
49. See ZENG, supra note 36, at 1.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 26.
53. See id. at 28–29. See generally Carroll, supra note 3, at 73–77 (detailing health and safety
risks specific to jail settings).
54. Barsky, et al., supra note 4, at 1583; see also Eric Reinhart & Daniel L. Chen, Association
of Jail Decarceration and Contagion Policies with COVID-19 Case Growth Rates in US Counties,
JAMA NETWORK OPEN: PUB. HEALTH, no. 9, Sept. 2021, at 1, 2 (“COVID-19 outbreaks in jails, prisons,
and immigrant detention facilities do not only pose risks to incarcerated people, they also appear to
spread to surrounding communities. This carries particularly pronounced consequences for Black and
Latinx communities that are subjected to disproportionately high rates of arrest and incarceration, which
may partially explain the disproportionate burden of COVID-19 that has been borne by racialized groups
in the US.”).
55. See Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 35.
56. See Detention Facilities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Mar. 11, 2021)
https://www.ice.gov/detention-facilities [https://perma.cc/8GCV-PXKR].
57. See Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 35.
58. For an effort to estimate numbers detained pursuant to civil commitment orders, see Gi Lee
& David Cohen, Incidences of Involuntary Psychiatric Detentions in 25 U.S. States, 72 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVS. 61 (2020).
59. See, e.g., Basank v. Decker, 449 F. Supp. 3d 205, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (involving ICE
detention in New Jersey jails).
60. 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 14. For a detailed examination of ICE detention, see
Emily Ryo, Introduction to the Special Issue on Immigration Detention, 54 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 750,
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incubation conditions for COVID-19” 61: overcrowding, close-quartered sleeping
and dining, spotty laundry and other cleaning services, and substandard medical
care. 62
That COVID-19 tore through American detention sites surprised few who
were paying attention, given the decrepit state of physical facilities, ongoing
failure to maintain adequate health and safety, and unique vulnerability of the
detainee population. COVID-19 migrates quickly across dense populations that
cannot distance or sufficiently suppress aerosol droplet dispersion, and where
both symptomatic and asymptomatic persons can spread the virus. 63 COVID-19
can cause serious illness or death, and it presents increased risk for individuals
with certain preexisting conditions—such as asthma—common to those in
detention. 64
Prevention and treatment at detention sites is limited. At this time, there is
no cure for COVID-19. In addition to vaccinating, the standard protocol for
minimizing spread includes physical distancing, mask wearing, hand washing,
restricting congregation, diagnostic testing, rigorous quarantining, and contact
tracing. 65 Vaccines have been distributed with varying degrees of success
although, at least initially, people in government custody had to file lawsuits
seeking vaccine access. 66 Despite urgent and clear recommendations from the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the American Medical Association,
the CDC long refused to issue guidelines prioritizing the vaccination of
detainees—focusing instead on staff. 67 In Colorado, state politicians spiked an
early plan devised by state health experts to vaccinate incarcerated people. 68 In

751–52 (2020). Juvenile facilities across the country experienced similar COVID outbreaks. See Josh
Rovner, COVID-19 in Juvenile Facilities, SENT’G PROJECT (May 18, 2021),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/covid-19-in-juvenile-facilities/
[https://perma.cc/R6N7-3DAR].
61. Thakker v. Doll, 451 F. Supp. 3d 358, 367 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
62. See id. at 367–68. See generally Letter from Scott A. Allen, Professor Emeritus, Clinical
Med., U.C. Riverside Sch. of Med. & Josiah Rich, Professor of Med. & Epidemiology, Warren Alpert
Med. Sch. of Brown Univ., to various House and Senate Committee Chairpersons and Ranking
Members (Mar. 19, 2020), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6816336/032020-Letter-FromDrs-Allen-Rich-to-Congress-Re.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z5M-UHZ5] (detailing COVID-19 risks at ICE
facilities).
63. See Clinical Questions about COVID-19: Questions and Answers (Transmission), CTR.
DISEASE
CONTROL
(Nov.
17,
2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/hcp/faq.html#Transmission [https://perma.cc/57Z2-6KKS].
64. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 2.
65. See id. at 22.
66. See, e.g., Conrad Wilson, In Lawsuit, Oregon Inmates Ask for Immediate Access to COVID19 Vaccine, OREGON PUB. BROAD. (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.opb.org/article/2021/01/22/oergonprisons-lawsuit-covid-19-vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/W5FU-SSCG].
67. See Barsky et al., supra note 4, at 1584.
68. See id.

128

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110:117

fact, jurisdictions are still struggling to vaccinate their detainee populations, due
in part to the failure to invest in vaccine education efforts. 69
2. The Official Response
By late March 2020, leadership across American institutions had a pretty
good idea that COVID-19 was going to severely test national commitments to
various health, religious, and economic priorities. There was also enough data
about how the virus spread in densely populated environments to appreciate the
grave risk for detention sites. 70 Public health experts cautioned that, in custodial
settings, effective medical isolation and quarantine required that facilities reduce
crowding and initiate other aggressive population management strategies. 71 The
experts emphasized that “the most urgent first-line strategy to limit spread and
improve containment is population reduction.” 72
The more populous the setting, the more difficult distancing becomes—and
overcrowding in detention facilities was a particularly stark challenge. On March
13, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a joint statement with
other international organizations containing guidance on preventing the spread
of COVID-19 in custodial settings, and it emphasized that overcrowding is an
“insurmountable obstacle” to COVID-19 response. 73 The WHO put out a formal
report two days later, recommending decarceration and the standard COVID-19
protocols recited above. 74 In October 2020, the NAS committee tasked with
studying the public health response to COVID-19 in custodial settings issued a

69. A December 2020 review of vaccination policies found that the plans of 38 states addressed
detainees, and that seven have designated detainees as top-priority. See David Montgomery, Prioritizing
Prisoners for Vaccine Stirs Controversy, PEW: STATELINE (Jan. 5, 2021),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/01/05/prioritizing-prisonersfor-vaccines-stirs-controversy [https://perma.cc/6D6L-9CUV]. Some of these programs have started.
See id. By the summer of 2021, there were some isolated success stories, but “most of the United States’
prison systems have struggled to vaccinate inmates.” Ann Hinga Klein, Some U.S. States Have Higher
Vaccination Rates Inside Prisons Than Outside, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/01/us/vaccine-prison-covid.html [https://perma.cc/H46U-LQPR].
70. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 12.
71. See, e.g., David H. Cloud, Cyrus Ahalt, Dallas Agustine, David Sears & Brie Willians,
Medical Isolation and Solitary Confinement: Balancing Health and Humanity in US Jails and Prisons
During COVID-19, 35 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 2738, 2738–42 (2020).
72. See Elizabeth Barnert, Cyrus Ahalt & Brie Williams, Prisons: Amplifiers of the COVID-19
Pandemic Hiding in Plain Sight, 110 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 964, 964 (2020).
73. UNODC, WHO, UNAIDS, and OHCHR Joint Statement on COVID-19 in Prisons and
Other Closed Settings, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 13, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/13-052020-unodc-who-unaids-and-ohchr-joint-statement-on-covid-19-in-prisons-and-other-closed-settings
[https://perma.cc/MX5G-TL3V].
74. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., PREPAREDNESS, PREVENTION, AND CONTROL OF COVID-19
IN
PRISONS
AND
OTHER
PLACES
OF
DETENTION
(2020),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/336525/WHO-EURO-2020-1405-41155-55954eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/AK4N-9ZM9]; see also Matthew J. Akiyama, Anne C. Spaulding & Josiah
D. Rich, Flattening the Curve for Incarcerated Populations—Covid-19 in Jails and Prisons, 382 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2075, 2075–77 (2020) (providing other expert guidance on correctional practices).
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report with similar recommendations. 75 It also underscored that conditions
modifications had to be coupled with discharge strategies: “[D]ecarceration is an
appropriate and necessary mitigation strategy to include in the COVID-19
response in correctional facilities . . . .” 76 Underscoring the importance of the
WHO and NAS recommendations more quantitatively, one widely-cited study
showed that a 9 percent drop in an urban jail population reduced transmission by
56 percent. 77
Those in the best position to take protective action nonetheless failed to
take it fast enough. Start with the institution at the center: the CDC. On March
23, 2020, it issued “Interim Guidance” for detention facilities, which has been
updated several times since. 78 The Interim Guidance was slim. It included no
detailed rules designed to mitigate known risks in custodial settings—in marked
contrast to its general rules for the public 79 and to other expert recommendations.
To be sure, the Interim Guidance was designed not to bind decisionmakers, but
to provide information about best practices to them, and it did include some more
clearly stated recommendations. 80 It recommended face coverings and regular
handwashing. 81 But it provided weaker suggestions on the most pressing topics,
inviting detention sites to “consider” certain health-protective action. It invited
facilities to consider restrictions on alcohol-based hand sanitizer, suspension of
work release and programs that assign individuals outside a facility, and certain
limits on transfers between facilities. 82 Most problematically, the subsequently
modified Interim Guidance continued to state that facilities needed merely to
“consider options to prevent overcrowding.” 83 It recommended social distancing
75. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 88–106.
76. Id. at 2.
77. See Barsky et al., supra note 4, at 1585 (citing Giovanni S. P. Malloy, Lisa Puglisi, Margaret
L. Brandeau, Tyler D. Harvey & Emily A. Wang, Effectiveness of Interventions to Reduce COVID-19
Transmission in a Large Urban Jail: A Model-Based Analysis, 11 BMJ OPEN 1, 6 (2021)).
78. See Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in
Correctional and Detention Facilities, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (Mar. 27, 2020) [hereinafter Interim
Guidance],
https://www.bop.gov/foia/docs//CDCCorrectionalfacilityguidance3.23.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KLL9-B6HU]. We note that, more recently, the Interim Guidance was updated on
June 9, 2021. See Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in
Correctional and Detention Facilities, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL (June 9, 2021) [hereinafter Interim
Guidance
June
2021],
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correctiondetention/guidance-correctional-detention.html#anchor_1623260857775
[https://perma.cc/LJ9GNG3W]; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 24, at 2247 (“As agency actions go, these
guidelines are informal.”); id. at 2249 (the guidelines were issued “largely without discernible
procedural safeguards” and with “almost no context describing its reasoning in adopting each specific
measure, and even less in rejecting alternatives”).
79. See Prevent Getting Sick, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/index.html [https://perma.cc/25PA8HMB].
80. See Interim Guidance, supra note 78.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. The June 9, 2021 modifications preserve that language. See Interim Guidance June
2021, supra note 78.
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as a vital precaution 84 but endorsed no mechanism for accomplishing that goal
in overcrowded facilities. It did not recommend release. 85 The failure to pair a
distancing recommendation with a guideline for responsible decarceration was
an obvious problem and was flatly inconsistent with the public health consensus
expressed in the WHO and NAS recommendations. 86
Many state and local correctional facilities, presumably observing that the
CDC Interim Guidance was both general and aspirational, ignored the broader
public health consensus. Many jails and prisons failed to comply even with the
CDC’s minimalist suggestions—they maintained restrictions on hand sanitizer,
refused to implement substantial screening programs, failed to impose or enforce
mask-wearing requirements on correctional staff, either under-enforced
distancing guidelines or ignored them altogether, insufficiently limited visitation
and transfer, and held facility admission and departure constant. 87 Testing
programs “proved to be a challenge” for many state correctional institutions. 88
The response in federal correctional facilities was a slightly different story,
with a similar ending. The Attorney General emphasized that “public safety” had
to guide the correctional response to COVID-19 but insisted on a definition of
public safety that did not always cut in favor of detainee health: “At the same
time that the defendant’s risk from COVID-19 should be a significant factor in
your analysis, you should also consider any risk that releasing the defendant
would pose to the public.” 89 The initial response of federal prisons included some
restrictions on visitation and transfer, as well as some screening and quarantining
of symptomatic detainees, but no testing program. 90 The Bureau of Prisons

84. See Interim Guidance June 2021, supra note 78.
85. See Developments in the Law, supra note 24, at 2255 (“[T]he interim guidance does not
mention release at all, except to suggest certain protocols for making sure the inherently transient
population of prison and detention centers does not infect communities on the way out.”).
86. See, e.g., 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 80 (“[R]elieving population pressures in
jails, prisons, and detention centers greatly facilitates adherence to CDC guidelines, controlling COVID19 outbreaks, and reducing health risks, particularly for medically vulnerable people.”).
87. See Keri Blakinger & Beth Schwartzapfel, When Purell is Contraband, How Do You
Contain
the
Coronavirus?,
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Mar.
6,
2020)
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/03/06/when-purell-is-contraband-how-do-you-containcoronavirus [https://perma.cc/ZBD7-JA85]; Editorial Board, Coronavirus Cases in Prisons Are
Exploding, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/coronaviruscases-in-prisons-are-exploding-more-people-need-to-be-let-out/2020/08/21/711b7b9a-e306-11ea8dd2-d07812bf00f7_story.html [https://perma.cc/T9QT-XCDW].
88. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 84.
89. Memorandum from William Barr, Att’y Gen., to All Heads of Department Components and
All United States Attorneys 2 (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/file/1266901/download
[https://perma.cc/B4QT-XVEV] (“Litigating Pre-Trial Detention Issues During the COVID-19
Pandemic”).
90. See COVID-19 Action Plan: Phase Five, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/20200331_covid19_action_plan_5.jsp [https://perma.cc/QTN46TNK].
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(BOP) denied most compassionate release petitions—as of June 2021, only
thirty-six such requests (out of over thirty thousand petitions) had been granted. 91
Success stories were few and far between, although there was a nontrivial
reduction in the size of the jail community. Between January and June of 2020,
the average prison population fell by 5 percent and the jail population by 20. 92
The decline in the jail population was actually steeper at first, but the population
increased somewhat after the initial drop. 93 The differences between jails and
prisons reflect the different correctional functions of the two facility categories—
with prisons housing those convicted and serving longer sentences and jails
housing those awaiting trial or serving shorter time. 94 Jails can dramatically
reduce population by admitting fewer prisoners; 95 prisons, by contrast, would
have to achieve substantial population reduction through discharge. Much of the
jail trend was accounted for by reduced crime, reduced arrests, and reduced
carceral sentencing; in contrast, there were very few prison discharges. 96
The combined result of extreme detainee vulnerability, waffling leadership,
and subordinate noncompliance has been—as one might expect—a catastrophe.
As the pandemic spread, the decarceration that bureaucracies needed to pair with
distancing mandates never materialized. The inability to physically distance and
to test for the virus swamped the anticipated benefits of other health and safety
recommendations, even when facilities followed them. 97 The COVID Prison
Project tracks public data concerning testing and cases in correctional facilities,
and, at the time of this writing, over 439,000 prisoners have contracted COVID19, and 2,661 of them have died. 98 There have been over 122,000 cases among
staff, with 242 deaths. 99

91. There have been 3,221 people ordered released under the provisions, but 3,185 of the
releases were ordered by judges, over the BOP’s objections. See Keri Blakinger & Joseph Neff, 31,000
Prisoners Sought Compassionate Release During COVID-19. The Bureau of Prisons Approved 36,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Jun. 11, 2021), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2021/06/11/31-000prisoners-sought-compassionate-release-during-covid-19-the-bureau-of-prisons-approved-36
[https://perma.cc/7B4T-FFNW].
92. 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 59–61. Some other sources have reported the change
in jail population in considerable detail and disclose figures that differ slightly from those reported by
the NAS. See, e.g., TODD D. MINTON, ZHEN ZENG & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON THE LOCAL JAIL POPULATION, JANUARY-JUNE
2020, at 1 (2021), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/icljpjj20.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2HD-GUZH].
93. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 59.
94. See CARSON, supra note 37, at 2.
95. See Emily Widra & Peter Wagner, While Jails Drastically Cut Populations, State Prisons
Have Released Almost No One, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 14, 2020),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/05/14/jails-vs-prison-update/ [https://perma.cc/5KPX-QEFF].
96. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 61.
97. See generally Barsky et al., supra note 4 (explaining the need to couple decarceration with
any other strategy for reducing COVID in detention facilities).
98. See COVID PRISON PROJECT, supra note 10.
99. See id.
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B. Rights, Custody, and Remedies
Lawyers scrambled to initiate state and federal litigation in venues across
the country. 100 They undertook that litigation in the shadow of doctrine that had
been configured for very different health-and-safety challenges. Before COVID19, legal disputes about health risk were often more individualized affairs—that
is, they did not occur against the backdrop of systemic risk posed by a pandemic,
and they were less likely to involve actions for collectivized relief. We focus
here on the state of doctrine that preexisted the pandemic. We identify the three
variables that best organize that law and that will best position readers to
understand the doctrinal changes that COVID-19 caused: (1) the type of custody
subject to challenge; (2) the nature of the underlying right to health-protective
detention conditions; and (3) the potential remedy.
1. The Custody Challenged
The first thing to think about when organizing the COVID-19 detainee
litigation is the type of custody being challenged. There is federal custody and
state custody, and then there is criminal and non-criminal custody. The
challenges available to people in detention will depend substantially on the
custody category. In other words, certain substantive claims and certain remedies
are available only to those in certain forms of custody. (See Table 1 for a visual
layout of how custody type relates to the site of detention.)
Table 1: Detention Site by Major Custody Type 101
Custody
Type
Convicted of
Crime

Sovereign
Federal

State

Pending
Trial

Federal
State

Site of Detention
Long Sentences: by BOP in federal prisons,
contracted private and local facilities
Short Sentences: by U.S. Marshals in BOPoperated facilities, contracted private, state, and
local facilities
Long Sentences: Prisons and contracted private
facilities
Short Sentences: Local jails and contracted
private facilities
By U.S. Marshals in metropolitan detention
centers, contracted private and local facilities
Local jails

100. Several projects track COVID-19 prisoner litigation. See, e.g., Special Collection: COVID19,
UNIV.
OF
MICH.
L.
SCH.:
C.R.
CLEARING
HOUSE,
https://clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=62
[https://perma.cc/6VEY-G8LS];
Covid-19 Behind Bars Data Project, UCLA L.: COVID BEHIND BARS DATA PROJECT,
https://uclacovidbehindbars.org/ [https://uclacovidbehindbars.org/].
101. See Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 35.
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Site of Detention

ICE detention centers, contracted private and
local facilities

A person subject to criminal custody is a person who has been convicted
and sentenced to confinement. These people form the largest detainee category
in correctional institutions. 102 They must generally litigate constitutional
challenges through Eighth Amendment claims that we describe momentarily. 103
Each sovereign, moreover, usually has a set of non-constitutional rights under
which the people it detains may seek discharge and relief for prison
conditions. 104 Those in criminal custody are in either a jail, if the sentence is
shorter, or a prison, if the sentence is longer.
Non-criminal custody is a little more complicated, in part because there is
more internal variation within the category. There is pretrial custody, where the
primary constitutional constraint on detention conditions operates through the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 105 People in
pretrial custody can also access select non-constitutional mechanisms to lodge
claims involving medical care—and, like those mechanisms available to people
convicted of crimes, there is state-by-state and federal variation. 106 Although
formally denominated as non-criminal, pretrial detention is often considered
correctional custody. Pretrial detainees in state custody are usually in local
jails. 107 Pretrial detainees in federal custody are formally under the control of the
U.S. Marshals, although they might be held at one of several types of detention
sites: a Metropolitan Detention Center operated by the BOP, a local jail, or a
private facility. 108
ICE detention, by contrast, is non-criminal and non-correctional. People in
ICE detention are there because the federal government has determined that they
should be held pending some immigration proceeding. 109 ICE custody can be
mandatory or non-mandatory, depending largely on the factual predicate for the

102. See id.
103. See infra notes 113 to 128 and accompanying text.
104. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 56.
105. See supra notes 129 to 142 and accompanying text.
106. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 55–56.
107. See Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 35.
108. See id.
109. See Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Nov. 12, 2021),
https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management [https://perma.cc/WWU7-4ZVZ].
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detention. 110 Because ICE custody is federal, the primary constitutional
provision at issue is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Crucially,
the non-correctional status of the detention means that people challenging ICE
custody need not satisfy the exacting exhaustion requirements that hobble
litigation undertaken by people in correctional custody. 111 Usually, people
detained pending immigration proceedings are physically held either at ICE
facilities or at local jails. 112
2. The Underlying Right
For purposes of mapping the decisional law, the second step centers on the
nature of the underlying right asserted. These rights spring from constitutions,
statutes, and other federal and state authority. Every government facility is
subject to the Federal Constitution. Other statutes and provisions impose
additional obligations and provide remedies for different custodial
transgressions.
a. Eighth Amendment Rights
In Estelle v. Gamble (1976), 113 the Supreme Court set forth the modern
constitutional framework for adjudicating convicted-prisoner challenges to
detention conditions. Gamble held that the Eighth Amendment obligates state
authorities to provide such people with “adequate medical care.” 114 And,
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” represents
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” that the Eighth Amendment
proscribes. 115 Gamble ended up forming the basis for a two-pronged Eighth
Amendment test. First, a plaintiff must demonstrate a sufficiently serious
deprivation of rights. 116 Second, they must demonstrate that correctional officials
acted with sufficiently culpable mens rea—amounting to recklessness or
deliberate indifference with regard to the deprivation. 117
However important Gamble was in establishing a formal right to health
protection for people in custody, subsequent decisions have diminished
110. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (setting forth categories of so-called “mandatory detention”); see
also Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. 137, 138 (2013) (discussing the relationship between mandatory detention and removal).
111. Specifically, those in detention pending immigration proceedings are not subject to the
structures of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See infra notes 155 to 166 and accompanying
text; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (“[T]he term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained
in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations
of criminal law.”).
112. See Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 35.
113. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
114. Id. at 105.
115. Id. at 104 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
116. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).
117. The deliberate-indifference prong was drawn straight from the language of Gamble. See 429
U.S. at 105.
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Gamble’s impact by upping the threshold for deliberate indifference. 118 In
Wilson v. Seiter, 119 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a Gamble plaintiff had to
show a serious risk and deliberate indifference and described the deliberateindifference requirement as a culpable state of mind. 120 Farmer v. Brennan 121
thereafter established that deliberate indifference required more than awareness
of the facts from which the inference of risk might be drawn; prison officials
“must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw the
inference.” 122 On the Court’s reasoning, the Eighth Amendment did not bar cruel
and unusual conditions; it barred cruel and unusual punishment. 123
Although the Supreme Court has articulated a high mens rea threshold, it
has made clear that convicted people can obtain relief before they suffer harm—
a rule that is obviously central to our discussion. 124 In Helling v. McKinney, 125 a
convicted detainee alleged an Eighth Amendment violation because he had been
placed next to someone who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day. 126 The Court
rejected the idea that the Eighth Amendment rule contemplates only realized
harm: “We would think that a prison inmate also could successfully complain
about demonstrably unsafe drinking water without waiting for an attack of
dysentery.” 127 The next observation was less memorable but no less important:
“Nor . . . may [prison officials] be deliberately indifferent to the exposure of
inmates to a serious, communicable disease on the ground that the complaining
inmate shows no serious current symptoms.” 128
b. Due Process Rights
The Eighth Amendment constrains only “punishment” and is therefore
inapplicable to non-criminal custody, such as pretrial or immigration detention.
For non-criminal detainees, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
118. Things did not start that way. Rhodes v. Chapman, decided in 1981, held the Eighth
Amendment governed conditions-of-confinement litigation concerning things other than medical care
and seemed to jettison the subjective component of the Gamble inquiry. See 452 U.S. 337, 344–50
(1981).
119. 501 U.S. 294.
120. The Supreme Court reasoned Rhodes omitted reference to the subjective prong only because
it was unnecessary to decide that case. See id. at 299–304.
121. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
122. Id. at 837.
123. Id.
124. In addition to precedent discussed below, the Supreme Court has addressed the problem of
communicable disease in other cases. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 531–32 (2011) (ordering
relief for prison overcrowding in partial view of effect overcrowding had on transmission of
communicable disease); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978) (capping punitive isolation in partial
view of transmission of communicable disease).
125. 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
126. See id. at 28.
127. Id. at 33.
128. Id.
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Amendments provide the operative constraints. Bell v. Wolfish 129 reaffirmed that
the government cannot subject people in non-criminal detention to conditions
that amount to punishment, 130 and it set forth a due process rule distinguishing
punitive conditions from those that are reasonably incident to legitimate, nonpunitive detention objectives. 131
The precise category of non-criminal custody subject to challenge is
important. For many years and for challenges to pretrial detention, courts largely
ignored Bell’s requirement that conditions be reasonably related to a legitimate
purpose in favor of a Gamble framework—even though the former is a blanket
rule against punitive conditions and the latter is a rule subdividing punitive
conditions into permissible and impermissible categories. That is, courts
historically analyzed due process challenges to pretrial custody by determining
whether there was an objectively serious deprivation of rights and deliberate
indifference thereto. 132 However, after Kingsley v. Hendrickson—a use-of-force
case, not a conditions-of-confinement case, that underscored Bell’s absence of a
subjective intent requirement 133—some courts subjected pretrial detention to a
modified Gamble rule consisting only of an objective prong. 134
Despite the pervasive use of rules derived from the deliberate-indifference
framework, these decisions do not provide satisfying explanations for replacing
a rule against all punitive conditions (Bell) with an inquiry meant to recognize
punitive conditions that the law permits (Gamble). For that reason, one can
129. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
130. Id. at 535.
131. Id. at 538.
132. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 881, 886 n.15 (2009) [hereinafter Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth
Amendment] (collecting sources and concluding that “courts routinely regard the Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights of plaintiffs challenging the conditions of their confinement in jail as
identical to those accorded sentenced offenders under the Eighth Amendment”); see also Whitney v.
City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 860 (8th Cir. 2018) (extending two-pronged standard to pretrial
detention context); Dang v. Seminole Cnty. Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017) (same); Alderson
v. Concordia Parish Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2017) (same).
133. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015). For an extremely useful discussion
of Kingsley and its potential significance for other types of litigation against correctional institutions, see
David M. Shapiro, To Seek A Newer World: Prisoners’ Rights at the Frontier, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 124, 131–33 (2016).
134. See, e.g., Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018) (“We thus
conclude . . . that medical-care claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment
are subject only to the objective unreasonableness inquiry identified in Kingsley.”); Darnell v. Pineiro,
849 F.3d 17, 34–35 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Following the Supreme Court’s analysis in Kingsley, there is no
basis . . . [to apply] the subjective intent requirement for deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth
Amendment . . . [to] apply to deliberate indifference claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Of
course, Kingsley was not about the two-pronged Gamble framework at all. It was a use-of-force case
rejecting a maliciousness requirement that applied to claims by convicted prisoners. See Kingsley, 576
U.S. at 398. For that reason, other courts continued to insist on the “subjective prong” of the deliberateindifference framework for pretrial adjudication. See, e.g., Whitney, 887 F.3d at 860 n.4 (“Kingsley does
not control because it was an excessive force case, not a deliberate indifference case.”); Dang, 871 F.3d
at 1279 n.2 (holding essentially same); Alderson, 848 F.3d at 419 n.4 (holding essentially same).
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imagine an analysis of non-criminal detention proceeding differently, and more
uniformly—tracking Bell’s rule against punitive conditions, with punitive
conditions defined as those not reasonably related to a legitimate government
objective. 135 Indeed, at one point or another, every court of appeals but one has
used the reasonable-relationship standard to adjudicate the constitutionality of a
non-criminal detention condition under the Due Process Clauses. 136 Most of
these cases came after Kingsley. 137
The distinction between this somewhat latent punitive-detention test (Bell)
and the more dominant deliberate-indifference approach (Gamble) became more
consequential in the ICE detention cases that followed the COVID-19
outbreak. 138 As a normative matter, there is a simple reason to keep deliberate
indifference out of the non-criminal detention analysis. People in non-criminal
detention have not been convicted of anything, 139 even if they are in pretrial
custody and their prosecution awaits. Constitutional protections regarding
conditions of pretrial confinement must be at least as strong as those regarding
prison because, as one court memorably put it: “[P]urgatory cannot be worse
than hell.” 140 Despite doctrinal and practical reasons to leave deliberate
indifference out of the non-criminal inquiry, confusion about constraints on noncriminal detention persists. 141
c.

Rights from Statutes and State Constitutions

Some rights arise under authority other than the Federal Constitution and
apply to both criminal and non-criminal detention. For example, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides federal statutory protection for individuals
with disabilities in public and private accommodations, including jails and

135. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 539; see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584 (1984) (holding
that the reasonable-relationship standard is “to be applied in evaluating the constitutionality of conditions
of pretrial detention”).
136. See, e.g., Almighty Supreme Born Allah v. Milling, 876 F.3d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 2017) (adopting
reasonable-relationship standard); E. D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2019) (same);
Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 182 (4th Cir. 2018) (same); Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626,
632 (5th Cir. 2019) (same); Malone v. Colyer, 710 F.2d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 1983) (same), abrogated on
other grounds by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cnty.,
850 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2017) (same); Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 483 (8th Cir.
2010) (same); Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (same); Blackmon v. Sutton, 734
F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2013) (same); Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir.
2016) (same); Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 598 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same).
137. See supra note 136; see also Shapiro, supra note 133, at 132–33 (predicting that Kingsley
might produce case law lowering burden on pretrial plaintiffs).
138. See infra Section 3.
139. Cf., e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 321–22 (1982) (“Persons who have been
involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than
criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.”).
140. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2004). But see Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383,
388 (4th Cir. 2001) (equating pretrial detainee and convicted prisoner standards).
141. See infra Part II.
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prisons. 142 Many cases challenging detention conditions have included ADA
claims, 143 which require plaintiffs to prove that they have a qualifying disability
and that they were harmed by intentional discrimination, a disparate impact, or
a failure to make a reasonable accommodation. 144
At federal and state levels, moreover, there can be standards for facility
healthcare incorporated into statutory and administrative frameworks. 145 For
example, there are statutory standards for discretionary pretrial release, 146 as well
as for discharge associated with overcrowding, 147 serious illness, 148 and disease
outbreaks. 149 There are also some break-glass-in-case-of provisions for
unanticipated emergencies, including (sometimes) powers to order evacuation or
closing of facilities. 150 State constitutions can be a source of significant
constraints on detention. 151 There are too many such rights to name, but each
vindicates some underlying interest in a health-protective detention practice.
3. The Form of Relief Requested
The last major axis helpful for plotting the COVID-19 prisoner litigation is
the form of relief requested. There are a few different remedies in play. Detainees
may seek damages or (functionally) injunctive relief, with the latter category
subdividing further into transfers, changed conditions, and discharge. Plaintiffs
asserting an Eighth Amendment violation might, for instance, seek
compensation for some past medical damage, some health-protective practice, a
release order, or a transfer to a different facility.
Start with compensatory remedies. For constitutional torts, people in state
custody can use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or seek state tort remedies, and those in federal
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (a)(5); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,
213 (1998) (holding that the ADA applies to state jails and prisons).
143. See infra Part II.
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12132.
145. See Kovarsky, supra note 3, at 83.
146. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01 (specifying authority for pretrial release). For a discussion
of legal authority to release people from pretrial detention, or order early release for short sentences, see
2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 55–56.
147. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-60 (2020) (specifying parole mechanisms for
overcrowding).
148. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3582(d); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1369 (2020) (providing for typical compassionate release
mechanism); WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g) (permitting compassionate release for “an extraordinary health
condition”). For an overview of state compassionate release policies, and why they are rarely used, see
2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 57–58.
149. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 126, § 26 (2020) (providing for transfer in case of a
sufficiently dangerous disease). For a brief overview of parole or medical furlough provisions, see 2020
NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 56.
150. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8658 (West 2021) (giving wardens authority to remove
endangered detainees); MD. CODE ANN. § 14-3A-03(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2018 & Supp. 2021) (stating
once Governor proclaims public health emergency, Governor “may order the evacuation, closing, or
decontamination of any facility”).
151. See, e.g., infra notes 235 to 238 and accompanying text.
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custody can use a so-called Bivens action. 152 For damages claims against state
and federal officials, plaintiffs will almost always have to overcome qualified
immunity or something similar. 153 During the pandemic, however, most
decisional law to date involves forward-looking emergency relief, rather than
backward-looking compensation for harm. 154
In federal court, many plaintiffs seeking non-compensatory remedies will
be subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). 155 The PLRA restricts
relief, for example, when state prisoners use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to seek
prospective remedies for constitutional violations, including orders for improved
conditions or discharge. The PLRA imposes strict administrative exhaustion
requirements. 156 Those exhaustion requirements are strictest when a plaintiff
seeks a “prisoner release order.” 157 Claimants seeking such a release, which
certainly includes discharge and arguably transfer, must show some sort of
noncompliance with a prior remedial order. 158 They can secure relief only from
a specially convened three-judge panel that must determine that crowding is the
cause of the harm and that there are no lesser ameliorative steps that the detaining
facility can take. 159 Crucially, the PLRA does not constrain litigation that
plaintiffs in ICE detention undertake. 160
The leading PLRA case involving prisoner release orders is Brown v. Plata
(2011), 161 which responded to overcrowding in California correctional
facilities. 162 Overcrowding, among other things, created serious medical risks
associated with communicable disease transmission. 163 Plata underscored that a
person in custody “may suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care. A
prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical
152. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
153. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978).
154. Over time, more victims’ families may file suits seeking compensation. See, e.g., Kelly
Davis & Jeff McDonald, Inmate’s Family Sues San Diego County over His Death, Alleges It Was
COVID, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-11-29/inmatesfamily-sues-san-diego-county-alleged-covid-death
[https://perma.cc/Z4MG-A7S2]
(describing
prisoner suit).
155. Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. 8, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (1996); see also
Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV.
153 (2015) (summarizing litigation trends under the Act).
156. Before a prisoner may file, the exhaustion requirements of the PRLA generally require them
to press a complaint through a facility’s grievance process, appeal to all available authorities for review,
and either receive a responsive ruling or wait for the time for such a ruling to expire. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). However, some cases are governed under existing settlement agreements, which may result
in remedies if they have applicable terms. See, e.g., Duvall v. Hogan, No. 94-2541, 2020 WL 3402301,
*7 (D. Md. June 19, 2020) (finding settlement terms not applicable).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3).
158. See id.
159. See id. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(ii).
160. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
161. 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
162. See id. at 499–500.
163. See id. at 509.
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care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in
civilized society.” 164 The Supreme Court ordered California to sufficiently
decarcerate to lessen health risks. 165 The remedy, however, was glacial; it took
over ten years for the case to move through the federal judiciary. 166
The PLRA contains what might look like an escape hatch. It does not
restrict relief in “habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of
confinement in prison.” 167 But habeas litigation, which is the traditional vehicle
for seeking discharge, presents different challenges. Convicted plaintiffs who are
litigating under habeas provisions, seeking release under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and
2255, must run a gauntlet of procedural obstacles—including rules requiring
them to satisfy exhaustion, 168 successive litigation, 169 and timeliness 170
requirements. Litigating for habeas discharge under § 2241 does not entail quite
the same procedural obstacles, but it is usually limited to people in non-criminal
custody. Moving from a § 2254 category to a § 2241 category would at least
appear to be difficult because § 2254 is expressly applicable to any “person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court.” 171
***
Part I provides the background necessary to understand and organize
information about COVID-19 litigation. Litigation against detention facilities is
generally complex, and the pertinent law is restrictive—particularly for largerscale relief. The controlling statutes and decisions usually require courts to defer
to custodial discretion and expertise, the latter of which is supposed to come from
repeated encounters with similar safety challenges. Having been configured to
address slower moving and less systemic health risks, however, these existing
bodies of related law were ill-suited to the pandemic threat. 172

164. Id. at 510–11.
165. See id. at 502.
166. See id. at 507.
167. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).
168. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (imposing exhaustion rule on prisoners serving state
criminal sentences).
169. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (imposing severe restrictions on litigation following initial
federal proceeding); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (incorporating § 2244(b) rules against those serving federal
sentences).
170. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (imposing one-year limitations period for bringing federal
habeas litigation on convicted state prisoners); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (imposing same on convicted federal
prisoners).
171. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). But see Michael L. Zuckerman, When the Conditions Are the
Confinement: Eighth Amendment Habeas Claims During COVID-19, 90 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 51 (2021)
(expressing sense that “most COVID-19 habeas claims arise under § 2241 rather than § 2254, 2255”).
172. Deference to detention practices that involve serious medical risks seems to make little sense
if the deferred-to institutions do not have the training and expertise to accurately assess them. Indeed,
there were serious concerns about the healthcare expertise of leadership at the federal Bureau of Prisons.
See Keri Blakinger, Prisons Have a Health Care Issue—And It Starts at the Top, Critics Say, MARSHALL
PROJECT (July 1, 2021), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2021/07/01/prisons-have-a-health-careissue-and-it-starts-at-the-top-critics-say [https://perma.cc/2VDB-C2UH].
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II.
COVID-19 PRISONER LITIGATION
In Part II, we organize information about the judicial response to COVID19 litigation against detention facilities. Although prior health-protective suits
contested institutional responses to other infectious disease outbreaks, 173 the
scope and systemic quality of the COVID-19 risk was something else entirely.
Given the novel interactions between injury, right, and remedy, the early
decisional law exhibited considerable variation. We focus on injunctive remedies
because there is not yet enough case law about compensatory relief to draw
firmer conclusions. In fact, many of the cases discussed below are not final
judgments; they are interlocutory responses to urgent, early-stage requests for
preliminary relief. 174
Before detailing how particular right-remedy combinations fared before
judges, a few global observations about the tenor of the judicial opinions are in
order. First, at an abstract level, judges seemed to appreciate the unprecedented
challenges that COVID-19 presented for Americans generally, 175 and for
detention sites more specifically—for detainees, 176 correctional staff, 177 and

173. Some earlier precedent came out of jail responses to the swine flu, but those decisions largely
denied relief because the infection was less threatening. See, e.g., Glaspie v. New York City Dep’t of
Corr., 2010 WL 4967844, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010) (“[M]ere exposure to swine flu does not
involve an ‘unreasonable risk of serious damage to . . . future health’ . . . .”). But see Fraher v. Heyne,
No. 10-cv-00951, 2011 WL 5240441, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2011) (finding that plaintiff with
preexisting heart condition who was denied swine flu test stated a claim).
174. See, e.g., Torres v. Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 746 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (granting
preliminary injunction); Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, No. 20-CV-00569, 2020 WL 2813072 (D. Conn.
May 29, 2020) (same); Seth v. McDonough, No. 20-CV-01028, 2020 WL 2571168 (D. Md. May 21,
2020) (granting temporary restraining order). Other early pandemic cases granted motions for class
certification or denied motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Busby v. Bonner, 466 F. Supp. 3d 821 (W.D. Tenn.
2020) (denying motion to dismiss and granting class certification in part).
175. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 804 (5th Cir. 2020) (“COVID-19 poses risks
of harm to all Americans.”); Desmond K. B. v. Decker, 477 F. Supp. 3d 357, 360 (D.N.J. 2020)
(describing “serious public health threat” but declining cases in New Jersey at the time); Malam, v.
Adducci, 475 F. Supp. 3d 721, 727 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (“More than four months after the first confirmed
case of COVID-19 in Michigan, the coronavirus pandemic continues to teach us about the importance
and power of collective action.”), amended by Malam v. Adducci, No. 20-10829, 2020 WL 4818894
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2020).
176. See, e.g., Rice v. United States, No. 19-CV-1026, 2020 WL 2892214, at *1 (W.D. La. June
2, 2020) (“The Court recognizes the risk to all prisoners posed by COVID-19.”); Gayle v. Meade, No.
20-21553, 2020 WL 1949737, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2020) (“The Undersigned has a great amount of
concern for all the detainees at the three immigration detention centers and the fear they are undoubtedly
facing every single day in the midst of this horrific and scary pandemic.”); United States v. Stephens,
447 F. Supp. 3d 63, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (collecting authority in support of proposition that “inmates
may be at a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 should an outbreak develop”).
177. See, e.g., Gayle, 2020 WL 1949737, at *5 (“The Undersigned also has concern for the staff
operating and working at the facilities. They, too, are undoubtedly scared—for themselves and also for
their families, who they see at home when their work shifts are over.”)
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surrounding communities. 178 One opinion captures a common tone: “The Court
struggles to put into words the magnitude of COVID-19’s devastation. . . . It is
universally recognized that COVID-19 poses a particularly tough challenge for
the incarcerated citizenry.” 179 In some cases, judges were even more granular in
their concern, discussing risks specific to certain detention categories. For
example, some decisions zeroed in on the threat of COVID-19 in ICE
detention 180 and the risks for large urban jails with high daily throughput. 181 The
content that follows, however, demonstrates that the appreciation of such risk
did not always pair with strong remedial instincts.
Second, much of the early decisional law developed in preliminary
procedural postures—for example, on motions for temporary restraining orders
(TROs) or preliminary injunctions. 182 (Many of the preliminary holdings
eventually gave way to final judgments, including permanent injunctions and
settlement agreements.) These preliminary orders were nonetheless an important
source of law, as time was then of the essence; courts were being asked to
respond quickly to the largely unchecked spread of COVID-19 in detention
facilities. Orders respecting preliminary relief almost always decided the real
winners and losers, and so they represent a logical object of scrutiny for our
project.
Third, and not surprisingly, judges granting relief tended to rely more
heavily on guidance from expert organizations, and on scientific information
from reputed medical and scientific journals. 183 Specifically, many opinions
relied heavily on the CDC Interim Guidance and the CDC Guidelines for People
at Increased Risk of Contracting COVID-19. 184 As explained above, however,
178. See, e.g., Vazquez Barrera v. Wolf, 455 F. Supp. 3d 330, 341 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (explaining
that “the public has an interest in preventing an outbreak” in a facility where it would “inevitably spread
through the surrounding community,” including hospitals and other healthcare providers).
179. Seth v. McDonough, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 247–48.
180. See, e.g., S. Poverty Law Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. CV 18-760, 2020 WL
3265533, at *4 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020) (citing ICE detention test positivity figures).
181. See, e.g., People ex rel. Stoughton v. Brann, 122 N.Y.S.3d 866, 870 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
(highlighting risk to people in New York City correctional custody associated with population churn
and staff contacts).
182. See supra note 174.
183. See, e.g., Desmond K. B. v. Decker, 477 F. Supp. 3d 357, 360 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2020) (citing
CDC statistics); United States v. Ramirez, No. 19 CR. 105, 2020 WL 4577492, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6,
2020) (relying on preliminary research studies showing that “patients with . . . diabetes, hypertension,
coronary artery disease and obesity might be at higher risk for severe disease or death from COVID19”); United States v. Aslam, No. CR 17-50, 2020 WL 4501917, at *4 (D. Del. Aug. 5, 2020) (relying
“primarily upon the CDC and the WHO” to assess the evidence presented).
184. See, e.g., Carlos M. R. v. Decker, No. 20-6016, 2020 WL 4339452, at *10 (D.N.J. July 28,
2020) (reminding respondents that “the CDC Guidelines have made clear that correctional facilities must
make ‘all possible accommodations’ to prevent transmission of infection to high-risk individuals”); Jose
M. C. v. Tsoukaris, 467 F. Supp. 3d 213 (D.N.J. 2020) (rejecting petitioner’s request for relief because
“although Petitioner suffers from hemorrhoids . . . this condition is not listed by the CDC as one which
places him at ‘higher risk’ for serious illness from COVID-19”); Ferreyra v. Decker, No. 20 CIV. 3170,
2020 WL 2612199, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2020) (relying on fact that “CDC guidelines provide that
people with asthma, or other respiratory problems are at a heightened risk of severe illness or death from
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the Interim Guidance contained light-touch suggestions on key points. And
several opinions granting relief underscored that satisfying the Interim Guidance
was not sufficient to show that detention conditions were lawful. 185
The body of decisional law available at this time shows that, in the first
year of the pandemic, courts entertained litigation against detention sites around
the country. That litigation relied on preexisting doctrine developed for lesser
health and safety threats, and the plaintiffs generally sought to change the
conditions of confinement or to obtain release. Although courts quickly
recognized the generalized threat from COVID-19, they were more often content
to secure institutional promises to comply with the light-touch CDC Interim
Guidance. Courts were less interested in exercising their own prophylactic
initiative or in operating a judicial receivership. To the extent that one category
of detainee-plaintiffs fared better than others, it was people in ICE detention—
they often had to make lesser constitutional showings than other categories of
detainee-plaintiffs. Furthermore, challenges to ICE detention are not subject to
the plaintiff-crippling provisions of the PLRA.
A. Discharge Litigation
Discharge was the most aggressive relief that detainee-plaintiffs sought,
and so it also proved the most elusive. Clear patterns emerged from the litigation.
First, notwithstanding public health recommendations that the most effective
COVID-19 practices required decarceration, courts were resistant to nonindividualized discharge. In fact, the more collectivized the discharge requests,
the more courts avoided them. 186 Discharge remedies were therefore awarded
either individually or to very narrowly drawn sub-classes of vulnerable
detainees.
Second, and in terms of courts’ willingness to order discharge in individual
or small collectivized cases, there were some very clear lines. Courts were more
willing to order discharge on the basis of rights arising under something other
than the Federal Constitution. And they were much more willing to use federal
constitutional law as a basis for discharge of people in ICE detention than for
discharge of people in correctional facilities.

contracting COVID-19”); Basank v. Decker, No. 20 CIV. 2518, 2020 WL 1953847, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 23, 2020) (“[T]he Court does not hold that the CDC’s guidelines amount to strict rules of
constitutional law that Respondents must follow in every circumstance[, but] failure to implement basic
elements of social distancing, isolation, and protective measures for high-risk individuals to be an
overwhelming indication that the conditions of confinement are dangerous to detainees . . . .”); Gayle v.
Meade, No. 20-21553, 2020 WL 1949737, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2020) (ordering detention facility
to “immediately comply . . . with the CDC and ICE guidelines on providing adequate amounts of soap
and water and cleaning materials to detainees”).
185. See, e.g., Ochoa v. Kolitwenzew, 464 F. Supp. 3d 972, 987 (C.D. Ill. 2020) (“[T]he CDC’s
guidelines, while important, are not dispositive standing alone.”).
186. See infra Section II.A.1.
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1. Collective Discharge
Courts were quite reluctant to order collective discharge for people in
correctional custody, which meant almost all class actions belonging to that
category of litigation were unsuccessful. 187 There were varied reasons for this
judicial behavior. Sometimes the obstacle to collectivized release was the
judicial imposition of a contested procedural doctrine, 188 and sometimes it was
a reluctance to resolve the merits against an institution in a class action case.189
We take those in turn.
Starting with procedural problems in discharge-seeking class action
litigation—a topic about which both of us have written (separately) at some
length. 190 Such class action litigation, at least in federal court, usually happens
under one of two procedural vehicles: either under the federal habeas corpus
provisions or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the latter of which provides for injunctive
relief against state officials that violate the Federal Constitution. 191 These
procedural mechanisms presented some daunting challenges for the litigation we
analyze here.
For example, the preference for § 1983 in conditions-improvement
litigation is based on the premise that discharge is not requested, because
discharge-seeking litigation takes place (the thinking goes) through habeas
lawsuits. But some courts refused to permit habeas litigation in conditions cases
where the detainee class also sought release. 192 Unfavorable treatment of habeas
class claimants seeking discharge from correctional facilities therefore persisted,
notwithstanding the PLRA’s exception for “habeas corpus proceedings
challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison.” 193 And in cases where
a mechanical rule about discharge litigation did not cause courts to subject the

187. See infra Section II.A.1.
188. See infra notes 190 to 196 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 197 to 199 and accompanying text.
190. See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (2007)
(exploring aggregation in criminal law more generally); Kovarsky, supra note 3 (exploring phenomenon
in more specific context of COVID-19).
191. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, 2255 (habeas provisions); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (establishing
cause of action against state officers for violating federal constitution).
192. See, e.g., Wilborn v. Mansukhani, 795 F. App’x 157, 163 (4th Cir. 2019) (observing seven
of “ten circuits that have addressed the issue in a published decision [and] concluded that claims
challenging the conditions of confinement cannot be brought in a habeas petition”); Seth v. McDonough,
461 F. Supp. 3d 242, 255 (D. Md. 2020) (refusing to treat habeas-denominated claims as PLRAexempt); see also Kovarsky, supra note 3, at 81 n.57 (collecting authority). But see, e.g., Wilson v.
Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 838 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that a medically vulnerable subclass of people
convicted of federal crimes could bring habeas action if the conditions litigation was for discharge, rather
than changed conditions); Vazquez Barrera v. Wolf, 455 F. Supp. 3d 330, 337 (S.D. Tex. 2020)
(“Because Plaintiffs are challenging the fact of their detention as unconstitutional and seek relief in the
form of immediate release, their claims fall squarely in the realm of habeas corpus.”).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).
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claims to the PLRA, judges applied various habeas exhaustion rules that either
mooted the litigation or forced the plaintiff class to de-collectivize it. 194
The exhaustion requirements applicable to people convicted in state courts
are difficult to escape. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) imposes an exhaustion condition,
without exception, on “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state
court.” 195 But courts have imposed exhaustion requirements on pretrial detainees
not subject to criminal convictions, too. Some courts have held that although
§ 2241 textually specifies no exhaustion requirement, grievances must
nonetheless be exhausted as a prudential matter. 196 The point about decollectivizing habeas litigation merits emphasis; these class-action holdings
meant that the main path to merits adjudication was an individualized showing
of exhaustion.
In fact, the judiciary crafted substantive tests that were quite incompatible
with class-action treatment. For example, a series of federal district courts
formulated an inquiry for habeas relief that resisted collective analysis: (1)
whether the petitioner has been diagnosed with COVID-19 or is experiencing
symptoms thereof; (2) whether they are at higher risk of contracting the
infection; (3) whether they have been directly exposed; (4) the effect of the
physical space in which they are detained; (5) the efforts that the prison has made
to prevent or mitigate harm; and (6) any other relevant factors. 197 Thus, as one
court put it, “the petitioner must make an individualized showing that he is
entitled to habeas corpus relief when considering the above factors.” 198
Predictably, some plaintiff classes were denied certification for failing to satisfy
the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement: “The differences among the factors
for all inmates (or detainees, to use the term from the instant case) are so vast
and fundamental that class treatment . . . is completely unworkable.” 199
Furthermore, and with respect to preliminary injunction requests, the
judiciary sometimes expressed a preference for timing that placed plaintiffs in a
catch-22. For example, in Baxley v. Jividen, the district court denied relief, noting
that it was too early to conclude that defendants were likely to violate the Eighth

194. See Kovarsky, supra note 3, at 81.
195. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (b) (emphasis added).
196. See, e.g., Cameron v. Bouchard, 462 F. Supp. 3d 746, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (noting that
the Sixth Circuit requires § 2241 exhaustion), overturned on other grounds by Cameron v. Bouchard,
815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2020). For pre-COVID holdings, compare, for example, Beharry v. Ashcroft,
329 F.3d 51, 56–57 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating exhaustion is prudential), with Little v. Hopkins, 638 F.2d
953, 954 (6th Cir. 1981) (requiring § 2241 exhaustion).
197. See Saillant v. Hoover, 454 F. Supp. 3d 465, 470–71 (M.D. Pa. 2020); see also Rice v.
United States, No. 19-CV-1026, 2020 WL 2892214, at *2 (W.D. La. June 2, 2020) (using comparable
set of factors and citing additional cases).
198. Saillant, 454 F. Supp. 3d. at 471.
199. Gayle v. Meade, No. 20-21553, 2020 WL 3041326, at *43 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

146

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110:117

or Fourteenth Amendments. 200 The court denied relief because the jail had no
reported positive cases of COVID-19, even though it recognized that the jail’s
planning would be “stress-tested” by the virus in the weeks after the order. 201 If
the court meant to suggest that the plaintiffs could protect their health-and-safety
interests by returning to the court after the outbreak, then such a theory is
troubling: the litigation would obviously be too late.
With the exception of habeas litigation, which was typically exempt from
the PLRA’s special rules for prisoner release orders, 202 the major problem with
PLRA-restricted litigation was the inability to obtain class-wide relief at
meaningful speed and scale. The rules for prisoner release orders, 203 which
contain rather extreme exhaustion requirements, entail complex and slowmoving procedures and require that any preliminary relief be “narrowly
drawn.” 204 Indeed, those restrictions on prisoner release orders were often
insurmountable. 205 The process of complying with the exhaustion requirements
and completing the special statutory process necessary to obtain a final judicial
order can take a decade or more 206—a timeframe that was useless to detainees
seeking to avoid COVID-19 risk. Classes seeking § 1983 relief sometimes
argued that the PLRA exhaustion requirements should yield in the face of the
special challenges that COVID-19 presented or because administrative remedies
were not available, but the plaintiffs had mixed success. 207
One way to avoid procedural obstacles to collective discharge was through
settlement. In Illinois, about 1,000 people who were nearing the end of their

200. Baxley v. Jividen, No. 18-1526, 2020 WL 1802935, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 8, 2020) (“[T]he
timing of Plaintiffs’ Motion factors into the Court’s decision. At present, there have been no reported
cases of COVID-19 in West Virginia prisons.”).
201. Id.
202. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).
203. Id. § 3626(a)(3).
204. The requirement of narrowly drawn relief appears throughout the PLRA. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (b)(2), (b)(3).
205. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (restrictions); Kovarsky, supra note 3, at 78 (insurmountability
thereof).
206. See supra notes 161 to 166 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 804 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding grievance
procedure “available,” such that plaintiffs were required to exhaust); Nellson v. Barnhart, 454 F. Supp.
3d 1087, 1094 (D. Colo. 2020) (finding nonexhaustion and noting “the Court may not alter the
mandatory requirements of the PLRA for COVID-19 or any other special circumstance”). But see
Duvall v. Hogan, No. 94-2541, 2020 WL 3402301, at *8 (D. Md. June 19, 2020) (refusing to apply
exhaustion bar to claim relating back to a date preceding PLRA and noting that administrative remedies
internal to jails do not cover release requests); McPherson v. Lamont, 457 F. Supp. 3d 67, 81 (D. Conn.
2020) (finding that “administrative remedies for the relief that Plaintiffs seek are unavailable, and thus
exhaustion is not required for Plaintiffs to proceed on their § 1983 claims”); Cameron v. Bouchard, 462
F. Supp. 3d 746, 767–68 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (noting case law regarding special circumstances in which
exhaustion is not required), overturned on other grounds by 815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2020); Fletcher
v. Menard Corr. Ctr., 623 F.3d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e think it’s also true that there is no duty
to exhaust, in a situation of imminent danger, if there are no administrative remedies for warding off
such a danger.”).
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prison sentences were released as part of a settlement in a federal lawsuit. 208
North Carolina settled constitutional claims, resulting in an agreement to release
3,500 people. 209 In Virginia, a federal suit resulted in a settlement requiring the
release of about 1,000 prisoners. 210 (We do not want to overstate the incidence
of settlement; one noteworthy feature of the COVID-19 litigation was settlement
avoidance and the state’s desire to litigate procedural barriers.)
2. Non-Constitutional Discharge
What also stands out is that—with the exception of the settlements and the
immigration detention discussed below—courts largely steered clear of the
Federal Constitution. That is, where there were discharge orders, they tended to
be pursuant to federal or state statutes, or state constitutions. And state courts
that afforded collective relief tended to do so under state constitutions, 211
statutes, 212 or other supervisory authority, 213 rather than under the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendments. 214 That statutory relief was more robust is unsurprising
given that courts generally avoided collective discharge; the substantive

208. See Jason Meisner & Annie Sweeney, About 1,000 Illinois Prisoners to be Released Under
COVID-19
Lawsuit
Settlement,
CHICAGO
TRIB.
(Mar.
23,
2021),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-illinois-prison-covid-lawsuit-settlement20210323-awvjaxszvjg5najbzaoloplrze-story.html [https://perma.cc/B7GQ-967A].
209. See Virginia Bridges, NC to Release 3,500 State Prison Inmates Early in COVID Lawsuit
Agreement,
NEWS
&
OBSERVER
(Feb.
25,
2021),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article249516810.html [https://perma.cc/45AR-8GGS].
210. See Whorley v. Northam, No. 20cv255, 2020 WL 2485923, at *1–3 (E.D. Va. May 12,
2020) (settlement resulting in agreement to release over 1,000 persons). But see Press Release, ACLU
Va., ACLU of Virginia Sends Second Notice of Noncompliance in COVID-19 Lawsuit Against VDOC
for Failure to Follow Court-Approved Settlement (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.acluva.org/en/pressreleases/aclu-virginia-sends-second-notice-noncompliance-covid-19-lawsuit-against-vdoc-failure
[https://perma.cc/TAP2-ULQM].
211. For cases relying on state law, see infra notes 235 to 238 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Karr v. Alaska, 459 P.3d 1183, 1185 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020) (interpreting bail
statute and concluding COVID constituted “new information” supporting revisiting pretrial conditions).
213. See, e.g., Comm. Pub. Couns. Servs. v. Chief Just. of Trial Ct., 142 N.E.3d 525, 543 (Mass.
2020) (setting out presumptions and categories of people in pretrial custody eligible for release and
describing similar orders by Michigan, New Jersey, and South Carolina supreme courts); Foster v.
Comm’r of Corr., 146 N.E.3d 372, 400 (Mass. 2020) (granting relief regarding drug-treatment-related
civil commitments using supervisory authority); In re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 231 A.3d
667 (N.J. 2020) (finding Executive Order created due process protections for several groups of people,
including minors in custody of Juvenile Justice Commission). But see In re Petition of Pa. Prison Soc’y,
228 A.3d 885, 887 (Pa. 2020) (declining to use supervisory authority to order immediate releases, but
rather directing lower-court judges to consider public health concerns and limit introduction of new
people to facility).
214. See, e.g., Foster, 146 N.E.3d at 395–96 (rejecting federal constitutional claims); Colvin v.
Inslee, 467 P.3d 953, 964 (Wash. 2020) (same); In re Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, No. 48053,
2020 WL 6387859, at *7 (Idaho Nov. 2, 2020) (same); People ex rel. Squirrell v. Langley, 124 N.Y.S.3d
901, 912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020) (same). But see N.C. St. Conf. of the NAACP v. Cooper, No. 20-CVS500110 (Gen. Ct. Just. Super. Ct. June 16, 2020) (order granting preliminary injunction finding state
standard to be the same as the federal deliberate-indifference standard).
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showings that statutory discharge remedies require tend to be more
individualized.
For people in federal custody, most judicial discharges ordered on nonconstitutional grounds were ordered under the pretrial release provisions (for
pretrial detainees) 215 or the federal compassionate release or home confinement
rules (for those convicted of crimes). 216 The federal pretrial detention statute
permits release for “compelling reason[s].” 217 It also allows judges to revise
pretrial detention orders “if the judicial officer finds that information exists that
was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material
bearing on the issue whether there are [suitable] conditions of release . . . ..” 218
Some judges granted relief under that statutory standard. 219 In that statutory
context, some federal judges adopted a hexa-variate formula for triage along the
lines described above: symptoms, vulnerability, exposure, physical environment,
available mitigation, and other factors. 220 Courts expressly linked that triage
function to the flexible pretrial standards set forth by the statute. 221
The federal compassionate release provisions are also typical in their
individuation requirements, 222 which permit sentence reductions—including to
time served—when there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant[ing] such a reduction.” 223 In a largely parallel rule appearing in the
sentencing guidelines, there is a more granular specification of “extraordinary”
circumstances, which includes individualized considerations of age and medical

215. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (containing rules for pretrial release); see also United States v.
Michaels, No. 16-76, 2020 WL 1482553, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2020) (granting temporary release
to defendant who was “of an age and has medical conditions that place him in the group most susceptible
to Covid-19”); United States v. Perez, No. 19 CR. 297, 2020 WL 1329225, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19,
2020) (citing person’s “serious progressive lung disease and other significant health issues”).
216. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (compassionate release); 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2)(A).
217. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i).
218. Id. § 3142(f).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Stephens, 447 F. Supp. 3d 63, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding
COVID-related release appropriate under “compelling reason” standard). Persons on bail facing
extradition have also been ordered released due to COVID risk on similar reasoning, citing the authority
of extradition treaty obligations. See In Re Extradition of Toledo Manrique, 445 F. Supp. 3d 421, 422
(N.D. Cal. 2020).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Wiseman, 461 F. Supp. 3d 740, 743 (M.D. Tenn. 2020) (applying
test developed in § 2241 habeas context, described in text accompanying note 196).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 447 F. Supp. 3d 399, 401 (D. Md. 2020) (linking authority
to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B)). For state courts following such an approach, see, e.g., Christie v.
Commonwealth, 142 N.E.3d 55 (Mass. 2020) (providing order for people in pretrial detention setting
out expedited and health-optimized release practice).
222. With respect to people convicted of federal crimes, we focus on compassionate release, but
the showing necessary to secure home confinement, which can be used in conjunction with
compassionate release, is similarly individualized. See Memorandum from William Barr, Att’y Gen., to
the Dir. of the Bureau of Prisons, (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus
/docs/bop_memo_home_confinement.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9S3-LZ6V] (“Prioritization of Home
Confinement as Appropriate in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic”).
223. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
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risk. 224 The need for individuation in compassionate release determinations is
reflected in the observations of one Third Circuit panel: “[T]he mere existence
of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a particular
prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release.” 225
People who were granted an immediate discharge under federal
compassionate release and home confinement provisions tended to be medically
vulnerable, to have medical conditions placing them in the CDC’s “at risk”
category, to have been detained in detention facilities with particularly poor
COVID-19 compliance, and to check other boxes relating to future danger and
flight risk. 226 In United States v. Shehata, 227 for example, the court granted a
request for immediate release from prison because, among other things, the
person was sixty years old, had medical conditions that placed him at an
increased risk of COVID-19 complications, and was detained in a facility with
COVID-19 cases. 228 In crafting compassionate release orders, federal courts
have wide berth to impose additional conditions necessary to ensure public
safety. For instance, in Shehata, the court reduced the person’s sentence to time
served, ordered home confinement for two years, extended the period of
supervised release, and required him to wear a location monitoring device. 229
Another source of discharge-seeking, non-constitutional litigation was the
ADA. 230 In federal litigation, most courts have held wholesale release is simply
not a “reasonable accommodation” under the ADA, even against the backdrop
of the COVID-19 threat. 231 In any event, ADA claims fared poorly whether the
defendant was a federal facility or a state one. (State and federal litigants are both
subject to PLRA exhaustion requirements. 232) In Wragg v. Ortiz, the court
disparaged the “bold” request that a federal facility “release any and all inmates
224. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
225. United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020).
226. In addition to the case discussed in this paragraph, see, for example, United States v. Aslam,
No. CR 17-50, 2020 WL 4501917, at *3, *5 (D. Del. Aug. 5, 2020) (granting motion for compassionate
release due to “history of tuberculosis, his history of viral hepatitis, his age, gender” and “absence of
dangerousness”), and United States v. Resnick, 451 F. Supp. 3d 262, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (granting
motion for compassionate release because movant is “65 years old [and] has diabetes and end-stage liver
disease, making him particularly vulnerable to COVID-19”).
227. No. 15-20052-01, 2020 WL 4530486 (D. Kan. Aug. 6, 2020).
228. Id. at *1.
229. Id. at *2–3.
230. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). The
analogous provisions in the Rehabilitation Act apply to federal programs. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
§ 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
231. See, e.g., Hurdle v. Comm’r of Corr., No. CV205000647S, 2020 WL 5540600, at *5 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2020) (holding release would not constitute a reasonable accommodation,
considering petitioner’s particular disability); Wragg v. Ortiz, 462 F. Supp. 3d 476, 514 (D.N.J. 2020)
(holding petitioner’s request to release all people who have any disability is not a reasonable
accommodation and that court must make individual circumstances determinations); Money v. Pritzker,
453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1133 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (rejecting ADA claims); Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d
799, 834 (E.D. Ark. 2020) (finding no likelihood of success on ADA claims).
232. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
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who may have any disability” as an “all or nothing approach” that was
inconsistent with necessary individuation. 233 In Money v. Pritzker, 234 a
representative piece of state-prisoner ADA litigation against multiple Illinois
facilities, the court turned back ADA theories. It reasoned that correctional
detainees were not the victims of intentional discrimination nor
disproportionately burdened by discretionary release procedures, nor denied
reasonable modifications of that process. 235
People in state custody had more luck for claims that arose under state law
but only in a handful of jurisdictions. In March and April of 2020, New York
courts, recognizing certain communities as especially vulnerable to COVID-19,
invoked the state due process clause to release many people from local jails. 236
The state due process doctrine was more flexible than its federal counterpart, and
judges could weigh competing interests in making discharge decisions. 237 While
some state courts indicated that their constitutional law provides broader grounds
for relief on Gamble-type claims, others acknowledged that possibility only
theoretically and have not departed from a more demanding “deliberate
indifference” test. 238 Some state judges relied on non-constitutional state
authority to expedite release, too—such as inherent supervisory power or court
rules for pretrial detention practices. 239
To conclude, those in correctional custody who asserted rights flowing
from authority other than the Federal Constitution fared better than those seeking
discharge under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. More
233. Wragg, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 514.
234. 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
235. See id. at 1132. Money was in federal court. Hurdle, typical of ADA litigation in state court,
rejected a request for discharge as reasonable accommodation, on the ground that he had PTSD and a
leg injury that left him uniquely vulnerable to COVID-19. See Hurdle, 2020 WL 5540600, at *5.
236. See, e.g., Writ of Habeas Corpus, People ex. rel. Stoughton v. Brann, Index No.
260154/2020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 25, 2020) (releasing 106 of 110 petitioners held on non-criminal
technical parole violations).
237. See, e.g., People ex rel. Stoughton v. Brann, 122 N.Y.S.3d 866, 869 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
(“The New York due process test is simpler. A court weighs the benefit sought by the government from
a condition against the harm that the condition imposes on inmates.”).
238. See, e.g., Smith v. State, No. 20-0185, 2020 WL 1660013, at *2 (Mont. Mar. 31, 2020)
(employing deliberate-indifference test while noting that Montana right combined with Eighth
Amendment to provide Montanans “‘greater protection[ ] from cruel and unusual punishment’ than the
Eighth Amendment”); In re Pauley, 466 P.3d 245, 259–61 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020) (noting Washington
has interpreted its state cruel punishment clause more broadly than Eighth Amendment but following
deliberate-indifference test); McGraw v. Comm’r of Corr., No. CV2050000631S, 2020 WL 3790738,
at *4–5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 2020) (citing a state analysis of habeas claim that used deliberateindifference test).
239. For example, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court ordered the release of pretrial detainees charged
with lower-level offenses by suspending detention orders. See In re Custody of State of Hawai‘i, 2020
WL 4873285, at *2 (Haw. 2020). In contrast, several state supreme and appellate courts refused to issue
writs of mandamus to provide emergency relief in response to COVID-19 at correctional facilities. See,
e.g., Kerkorian v. Sisolak, 462 P.3d 256, 2020 WL 2121524, at *2 (Nev. Apr. 30, 2020) (denying
mandamus petition and citing to similar rulings by the Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, and
Washington courts).
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specifically, there was some measured success under federal statutes configured
for individual relief—provisions permitting medical release for pretrial and
convicted federal detainees—and under state law. 240 Indeed, except for the
category discussed below, most collective discharge orders involved rights
arising under state constitutions.
3. The Constitutional Exception: Immigration Detention
Courts were largely unwilling, on the basis of laws arising under the Federal
Constitution, to discharge people convicted of crimes. Litigants subject to ICE
detention, however, fared somewhat better, 241 particularly in the First and Ninth
federal circuits. 242 Freed from the PLRA and working with a more plaintifffriendly suite of constitutional rights, 243 many courts found punitive
conditions, 244 deliberate indifference, 245 or both. For example, the Ninth Circuit
240. See supra Part II.A.2.
241. People in ICE custody might be subject to detention designated as mandatory or nonmandatory. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. For our purposes, that distinction is less
important because courts have generally refused to interpret the statutory status of “mandatory”
detention to preclude release in the face of constitutional violations. See, e.g., Malam v. Adducci, 452
F. Supp. 3d 643, 662 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (“But as set forth above, Petitioner’s continued detention is in
violation of the United States Constitution, to which 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) must give way.”); Basank v.
Decker, 449 F. Supp. 3d 205, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“However, courts have the authority to order those
detained in violation of their due process rights released, notwithstanding § 1226(c).”).
242. See infra notes 246 to 254 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Yanes v. Martin, 464 F.
Supp. 3d 467, 475 (D.R.I. 2020) (ordering release at Wyatt Detention Facility in Rhode Island), appeal
dismissed, No. 20-1762, 2020 WL 8482783 (1st Cir. Oct. 6, 2020); Gomes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., Acting Sec’y, 460 F. Supp. 3d 132, 135 (D.N.H. 2020) (ordering relief for those detained at
Strafford County House of Corrections notwithstanding “highly competent superintendent who has
approached this public health emergency with great concern”); Alcantara v. Archambeault, No.
20cv0756, 2020 WL 2315777, at *8 (S.D. Cal. May 1, 2020) (collecting cases and observing that, “[i]n
the Ninth Circuit, the majority of district courts that have considered the issue have concluded there is a
likelihood [that] plaintiffs [subject to ICE detention] will prevail on [Fifth Amendment due process]
claims,” before ultimately agreeing with that majority). In contrast to the examples in this footnote and
recited below, the Third Circuit denied punitive-conditions and deliberate-indifference claims where the
plaintiffs had asserted they were being detained notwithstanding their elevated COVID-19 risk. See
Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 326–31 (3d Cir. 2020).
243. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing inapplicability of PLRA).
244. Federal courts in New Jersey, for example, were particularly likely to order release on the
ground that some detention condition was punitive because the condition was not reasonably related to
a legitimate government interest and therefore amounted to punishment. See, e.g., Desmond K. B. v.
Decker, 477 F. Supp. 3d 357, 369–70 (D.N.J. 2020) (finding in favor of relief on ground treatment was
not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose); Carlos M. R. v. Decker, No. CV 20-6016,
2020 WL 4339452, at *12 (D.N.J. July 28, 2020) (same); Armando C. G. v. Tsoukaris, No. CV 205652, 2020 WL 4218429, at *9 (D.N.J. July 23, 2020) (same). Some of these courts even went out of
their way to underscore that the deliberate-indifference framework did not control punitive-conditions
claims. See, e.g., Desmond K. B., 447 F. Supp. 3d at 370 (finding that the plaintiff was unlikely to
succeed on his “deliberate indifference claim”); Carlos M. R., 2020 WL 4339452, at *11 n.27 (same).
245. A federal judge in Florida ordered the release of 58 ICE detainees, noted that the
constitutional standards for criminal and non-criminal detention were different, and nevertheless
determined that the facilities had been deliberately indifferent. See Gayle v. Meade, No. 20-21553-CIV,
2020 WL 2086482, at *3, *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2020), order clarified, No. 20-21553-CIV, 2020 WL
2203576 (S.D. Fla. May 2, 2020); see also, e.g., Castillo v. Barr, 449 F. Supp. 3d 915, 922–23 (C.D.
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approved a district court decision provisionally certifying a class of 1,370 people
housed at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center, determining that the detention
conditions violated the Fifth Amendment and ordering that population be
reduced so as to allow social distancing. 246 The Ninth Circuit also approved of a
district court order to institute a bail process for ICE detainees at the Mesa Verde
Detention Facility and the Yuba County Jail, resulting in the indefinite release
of over 130 people. 247 And a federal district court in Massachusetts certified a
class of people detained at Bristol County House of Correction, ultimately
ordering that the facility stop admissions and institute bail proceedings for people
who remained. 248
One of the most important developments grew out of a nationwide
injunction issued by a judge in the Central District of California. In Fraihat v.
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, the court certified a class consisting
of all people in ICE custody who had risk factors or disabilities, making them
more vulnerable to COVID-19. 249 Citing ICE’s decision to adopt non-binding
guidance for the first month of the pandemic and the failure to formulate a plan
for those who were especially vulnerable, the court determined that ICE had been
deliberately indifferent—specifically, that it had exhibited “callous indifference
to the safety and wellbeing of the Subclass members.” 250 It also found that the
ICE detention amounted to punitive confinement in violation of Bell 251 and that
it violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 252 The court ultimately required
ICE to identify, track, and make individualized custody determinations for
vulnerable people in ICE detention. 253 ICE responded by transmitting what it

Cal. 2020) (finding deliberate indifference against ICE facility). By contrast, federal courts in New York
were unaware of or ignored problems with applying a deliberate-indifference rule in non-criminal cases,
but were willing to order relief nonetheless. See, e.g., Avendaño Hernandez v. Decker, 450 F. Supp. 3d
443, 447–48 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2020) (conducting deliberate-indifference analysis to grant release);
Barbecho v. Decker, No. 20-cv-2821, 2020 WL 1876328, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2020) (same);
Ferreyra v. Decker, No. 20 CIV. 3170, 2020 WL 2612199, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2020) (same);
Basank v. Decker, No. 20 CIV. 2518, 2020 WL 1953847, at *9–12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2020) (same);
see also, e.g., Malam, 452 F. Supp. 3d at 658 (“This type of Fifth Amendment claim is analyzed under
the same rubric as Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
246. See Roman v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 935, 942–45 (9th Cir. 2020). By the time the Ninth Circuit
reviewed the order, the 1,370-person plaintiff class was comprised of only 748 people who remained in
detention. See id. at 945.
247. See Zepeda Rivas v. Jennings, 845 F. App’x 530, 532–33 (9th Cir. 2021).
248. See Savino v. Souza, 459 F. Supp. 3d 317, 321 (D. Mass. 2020).
249. See 445 F. Supp. 3d 709, 736–41 (C.D. Cal. 2020), order clarified, No. 19-1546, 2020 WL
6541994 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2020), and rev’d and remanded, 16 F.4th 613 (9th Cir. 2021).
250. Id. at 743–46.
251. See id. at 746–47.
252. See id. at 747. The Rehabilitation Act parallels the ADA, except that it applies to federal
detention.
253. See id. at 751.
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called a “broadcast message” directing its field offices to conduct Fraihat
determinations in accordance with the court order. 254
In terms of raw docket entries, the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey heard many cases. At the beginning of the pandemic, the district
court chief issued a (controversial) standing order requiring individualized
treatment of detainee litigation. 255 Judges there began to use a three-category
approach to triage relief for people in ICE custody, depending on whether they
were (1) COVID-negative and not in the special vulnerability categories; (2)
COVID-negative but in the special vulnerability categories; and (3) COVIDpositive. 256 Judges entertaining ICE litigation generally refused discharge to
people in the first category, sometimes with caveats about how the result could
change if circumstances at the facility did. 257 Courts were more willing to invoke
the Federal Constitution in favor of discharge for people in the second category,
provided there were ways to protect state interests upon release. 258 Courts were
254. See ENF’T & REMOVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, COVID-19
PANDEMIC
RESPONSE
REQUIREMENTS
(2021),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/coronavirus/eroCOVID19responseReqsCleanFacilities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5FN2-ZCME]. Regarding broadcast messages to field offices, see DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-21-58, ICE’S MANAGEMENT OF COVID-19 IN ITS
DETENTION FACILITIES PROVIDES LESSONS LEARNED FOR FUTURE PANDEMIC RESPONSES 24 (2021),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2021-09/OIG-21-58-Sep21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/42DH-H75F] (“On three occasions, ERO sent broadcast e-mails to all field offices
with an attached list of Fraihat subclass members who still needed custody re- determinations.”), at
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2021-09/OIG-21-58-Sep21.pdf. In the immediate
aftermath of that order, the practical onus remained on the detained person—or their family or lawyer—
to identify their at-risk status, provide appropriate documentation, and move custody-review
proceedings forward. See E-mail from Benjamin Salk to Lee Kovarsky (Mar. 16, 2021, 16:38 CST) (on
file with author). Perhaps for this reason, on March 10, 2021, the district court agreed to appoint a special
master to administer the ordered relief. See Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Special Master,
Fraihat v. ICE, No. 19-cv-01546 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 281.
255. See In re Habeas Petitions from Immigr. Detainees Seeking Immediate Release Due to
COVID-19 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2020) (standing order), https://www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/202010.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZGX2-HV8P]; see also Letter from Jeanne LoCicero, Legal Dir., ACLU of
N.J., Lauren Major, Managing Att’y, Det. Project, Zoe Levine, Legal Dir., Immigr. Prac., Bronx Defs.,
Richard Bailey, Supervising Immigr. Att’y, Brooklyn Def. Servs., Alisa Wellek, Exec. Dir., Immigr.
Def. Project, Lawrence S. Lustberg, Dir., John J. Gibbons Fellowship in Pub. Interest & Const. L.,
Deborah Lee, Deputy-Att’y-in-Charge, Immigr. L. Unit, Legal Aid Soc’y & Lori A. Nessel, Dir., Ctr.
for Soc. Just., Seton Hall Univ. Sch. of L., to Chief Judge Freda L. Wolfson, Dist. of N.J. (Apr. 22, 2020)
(on file with author) (challenging practice).
256. See, e.g., Romeo S.K. v. Tsoukaris, No. 20-5512, 2020 WL 2537647, at *5 (D.N.J. May 18,
2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 20-5512, 2020 WL 4364297 (D.N.J. July 29, 2020)
(developing categories); see also Oscar P. C. v. Tsoukaris, No. CV 20-5622, 2020 WL 4915626, at *9
(D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2020) (using framework); Desmond K. B. v. Decker, 477 F. Supp. 3d 357, 367 (D.N.J.
2020) (same); Nicole B. v. Decker, No. 20-7467, 2020 WL 4048060, at *7 (D.N.J. July 20, 2020)
(same); Jose M. C. v. Tsoukaris, 467 F. Supp. 3d 213, 224 (D.N.J. 2020) (same).
257. See, e.g., Nicole B., 2020 WL 4048060, at *7 (“The petitions of detainees in the first category
(no particular risk factors) have generally been denied.”); Romeo S.K., 2020 WL 2537647, at *5
(including caveat about changed circumstances).
258. See, e.g., Nicole B., 2020 WL 4048060, at *7 (noting that petitions of persons with risk
factors “have been granted or denied depending on the circumstances—especially, the level of the risk
to the prisoner under conditions at the institution”).
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usually unwilling to discharge people in the third category—those with COVID19—on the theory that they would present too much of a danger to public health,
by which courts seemed to have meant the health of people who were not in
custody. 259 In adjudicating relief for people in these categories, these federal
courts were especially focused on using the punitive-conditions framework
rather than the deliberate-indifference analysis crafted for prison conditions. 260
In sum, the ICE detention cases are a site of relatively greater judicial
discharge for three interrelated reasons. First, the non-criminal status of the
detention meant that there was a lower threshold for constitutional injury.
Second, there was no statutory alternative for discharge remedies; 261 for the most
part, courts lacked access to statutes that would have kept relief more
individualized. Third, the PLRA did not require onerous exhaustion before
seeking relief from a federal court.
B. Changed Conditions
Along with discharge, people in custody often sought orders for defendants
to adopt health-protective practices—that is, to change facility conditions.
Discharge is a prerequisite to many such practices because overcrowding makes
them otherwise impossible. 262 The dominant rights associated with requests for
changed conditions arose under the Federal Constitution or the ADA. 263
Ordering remedies for violations of those rights, unlike ordering statutory
discharge under a pretrial or compassionate release provision, often required
courts to make guilt-suggestive findings against institutions that some appeals
courts were reluctant to endorse.
The CDC Interim Guidance loomed over conditions litigation. Institutions
that complied with the Guidance were typically inoculated against coercive
relief. 264 Plaintiffs, however, did obtain orders for certain mitigation measures
that went beyond the CDC recommendations, such as staff retainage necessary
to segregate facility residents, testing necessary to identify outbreaks and triage
treatment, and psychiatric resources necessary to protect the community’s
259. See, e.g., Romeo S.K., 2020 WL 2537647, at *5 (“Yet, once a detainee tests positive, the
public also has an interest in not introducing additional cases into the general public.”).
260. See supra note 244 (citing District of New Jersey cases).
261. See, e.g., supra note 215 (federal pretrial detention statute); cf, e.g., United States v. Lee,
451 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2020) (rejecting due process challenge to pretrial detention).
262. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 2 (“[D]ecarceration is an appropriate and
necessary mitigation strategy to include in the COVID-19 response in correctional facilities . . . .”).
263. See supra Part I.B.2.
264. See, e.g., Duvall v. Hogan, No. 94-2541, 2020 WL 3402301, at *13 (D. Md. June 19, 2020)
(holding evidence suggests defendants were following CDC guidelines and denying emergency motion
for mitigation); Roman v. Wolf, 2020 WL 2188048, at *1 (9th Cir. May 5, 2020) (staying injunction to
extent it exceeded CDC guidelines); In Re Petition of Pa. Prison Soc’y, 228 A.3d 885, 887 (Pa. 2020)
(ordering facilities to comply with CDC Guidance). For a critique of the deference given to CDC
guidance in conditions of confinement litigation, see Developments in the Law, supra note 24, at 2234–
54.
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mental health. 265 Some temporary relief also directed that defendants follow
CDC recommendations to identify and monitor at-risk detainees, provide
additional staff and detainee training, circulate PPE and hygiene products,
develop protocols for testing and isolation, and practice appropriate social
distancing. 266 When jails had nominally robust policies but failed to enforce
them, some courts were also willing to escalate remedies to ensure meaningful
implementation. 267 (Over time, many of these orders were reversed on
appeal. 268)
Many courts required compliance with the CDC Interim Guidance and no
more. In a representative case, Seth v. McDonough, 269 the federal district court
issued one such injunction. 270 In that case, a Maryland county jail had attempted
some compliance by providing additional soap and increased temperature
checks, 271 but those measures fell short of the Interim Guidance. The court
concluded that the jail “implemented no functional plan to afford such [highrisk] detainees any additional screening, supervision, segregated housing, or any
like measure.” 272 As a result, the judge entered a narrow injunction designed only
to protect high-risk prisoners. 273
For cases involving constitutional violations, injunctive remedies requiring
health-protective practices were far more common than collective discharge
orders. 274 In part because lower courts were, relatively speaking, more willing to
order broader relief that entailed more ongoing judicial involvement, such orders
also triggered more appellate blowback. In Ahlman v. Barnes, 275 the Orange
County jail case, the district court had refused a collective discharge remedy but
ordered stricter health-and-safety measures because it found that the site’s

265. See, e.g., Carranza v. Reams, No. 20-cv-00977, 2020 WL 2320174, at *15 (D. Colo. May
11, 2020) (granting request to segregate medically vulnerable persons); Gray v. Cnty. of Riverside, 13cv-00444 (C.D. Cal. April 16, 2020) (granting order requiring physically distanced housing, segregation
of medically vulnerable people, and enhanced mental health resources for those quarantined). But see
Mays v. Dart, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1094 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2020) (denying request to segregate).
266. See, e.g., Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, 694 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (ordering spacing,
communication protocols, provision of sanitary implements and access to showers and laundry, the
wearing of personal protective equipment, handwashing, temperature checks, and rapid medical
response); Seth v. McDonough, 461 F. Supp. 3d 242, 265 (D. Md. 2020) (ordering comparable relief);
Swain v. Junior, No. 20-cv-21457, 2020 WL 1692668, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2020) (same); Banks
v. Booth, 459 F. Supp. 3d 143, 161–63 (D.D.C. 2020) (same). But see Sanchez v. Brown, 2020 WL
2615931, at *19 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 2020) (declining to impose CDC guideline compliance on jail for
fear of impinging on a legislative role and threatening federalism).
267. Banks, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 161–63.
268. See infra Part III.A.4.
269. 461 F. Supp. 3d at 253.
270. See id. at 265.
271. See id. at 251–52 (temperature checks); id. at 254 (soap).
272. Id. at 254.
273. See id. at 254–55.
274. See supra Part II.A.1.
275. 445 F. Supp. 3d 671 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
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practices likely violated the Federal Constitution. 276 The district court noted that
the CDC Interim Guidance was “not a statute, nor [was] it a mandate,” 277 but
nevertheless treated it like “expert medical advice regarding measures needed to
limit the spread of COVID-19.” 278 The failure to implement those measures, the
district court reasoned, was deliberate indifference. 279 The Supreme Court
ultimately stayed this injunction, 280 mooting the remedy.
Ahlman wasn’t the only case where appellate courts intervened to disable
conditions-improvement orders entered by federal district court judges. In Mays
v. Dart, the district court entered a preliminary injunction against Chicago’s
Cook County jail. 281 The court ordered the jail to end group housing and doublecelling and to improve sanitation, testing, and provision of personal protective
equipment. 282 The Seventh Circuit substantially narrowed that injunction,
refusing to order altered facility protocols for housing and cell population. 283 The
story was the same when lower courts ordered remedies for non-constitutional
violations, too. Valentine v. Collier 284 was a case involving a Texas geriatric
prison—the “Pack Unit”—in which the district court judge entered preliminary
and permanent injunctions based on ADA violations. 285 The Fifth Circuit
ultimately paused all injunctive relief pending appeal, finding that the suit was
unlikely to succeed: the plaintiffs had failed to properly exhaust administrative
remedies. 286
In sum, remedies ordering improved health-and-safety practices pose
challenges that are distinct from those ordering discharge. Discharge remedies
can be individualized by relying on applicable statutes, but injunctions requiring
improved conditions are collective relief that redounds to the benefit of some
facility population. The primary rights for injunctive remediation usually arise
under the Federal Constitution or the ADA. Both tend to require findings about
the insufficiency of institutional response—findings that judges have been more
hesitant to make. Faced with acute line-drawing problems and questions about
institutional competence, courts largely turned to the thin CDC Interim Guidance
for a standard of care.

276. See id. at 694–95. The facility housed detainees in overcrowded dorms, holding cells, and
common areas; failed to provide people in custody with hygiene supplies; and inadequately quarantined
and tested exposed residents. See id. at 681–82.
277. Id. at 690.
278. Id.at 691.
279. See id. at 692.
280. See Barnes v. Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. 2620, 2620 (2020) (mem.).
281. Mays v. Dart, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1099 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
282. See id. at 1099–1101.
283. See Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 824 (7th Cir. 2020).
284. Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2020).
285. Valentine v. Collier, 490 F. Supp. 1121, 1127–28, 1170, 1171–72 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2020)
(describing preliminary and entering permanent injunction), rev’d, 993 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2021).
286. See Valentine, 978 F.3d at 158. The Fifth Circuit also held that the Eighth Amendment claim
would not succeed on the merits. See id. at 165.
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C. Other Relief
During the COVID-19 pandemic, some people in custody sought forwardlooking relief that did not fit neatly into a discharge-versus-conditions
dichotomy. In such scenarios, courts have not ordered discharge or improved
health-and-safety practices per se; but they often ordered process auxiliary to
conditions improvement or discharge. 287
One of the most common secondary remedies was an order for detention
authorities to comply with the judge-made process for health-optimized release.
For example, a federal court in California ordered expedited consideration of
compassionate release requests made by people convicted of federal crimes. The
order included a notification rule, as well as requirements that eligibility be
determined quickly and in light of health risk. 288 Some courts, however, were
reluctant to assume receivership roles requiring them to specify and oversee the
process for discharge. In Russell v. Harris County, 289 a federal judge in Houston
was clearly distressed by risks to a pretrial detainee population being discharged
at insufficient rates 290 but was unwilling to require the federal court to supervise
local judges adjudicating bail requests. 291 The judge observed: “Given how this
case differs from other COVID-19 litigation, the court is operating on uncertain
legal terrain with limited guidance.”292
Some requests for secondary remediation were auxiliary not to release
protocols, but to conditions-improvement remedies. In Gayle v. Meade, 293 and
in the shadow of constitutional law barring deliberate indifference to detainee
health, the federal court had entered a preliminary injunction to improve
conditions in a Florida ICE detention facility. 294 When the plaintiffs credibly
alleged non-compliance therewith, the court appointed a Special Master to
evaluate facility practices and administer necessary relief. 295 In North Carolina,
a trial court similarly appointed a Special Master to oversee correctional
287. See, e.g., In re Petition of Pa. Prison Soc’y, 228 A.3d 885, 887 (Pa. 2020) (invoking
equitable and supervisory power over lower courts and holding that judges “should consult with relevant
county stakeholders to identify individuals and/or classes of incarcerated persons for potential release or
transfer”); Foster v. Comm’r of Corr., 146 N.E.3d 372, 400 (2020) (“Nonetheless, we see fit to address
the situation under our supervisory authority. Going forward, a judge shall not commit an individual
under G. L. c. 123, § 35, unless the judge finds that the danger posed by the individual’s substance use
disorder outweighs the risk of transmission of COVID-19 in congregate settings.”).
288. See Torres v. Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713, 746 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
289. 454 F. Supp. 3d 624 (S.D. Tex. 2020).
290. See id. at 634 (“All fear that current processes are releasing too few arrestees relative to new
arrivals to stop the virus from spreading in the Jail.”).
291. See id. at 639.
292. Id. at 635. In many localities, bond reduction rules were used to shrink jail populations,
sometimes quite dramatically, and often with cooperation between among lawyers, prosecutors, and the
court. See Malia Brink, Hero Public Defenders Respond to Covid-19, CRIM. JUST. MAG., Summer 2020,
at 39, 41.
293. No. 20-21553, 2020 WL 4047334, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2020).
294. See id. at *2–3.
295. See id. at *3–4.
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compliance with conditions-related preliminary orders, after finding that state
officials were probably violating the state and federal constitutions. 296
Although much of this one-off remediation came after a plaintiff prevailed
in litigation that remained adversarial to the end, some of it came by way of
settlement—which resulted in operational changes, collaborative monitoring,
and expedited release practices. In California, for instance, convicted detainees
successfully modified an existing settlement agreement in order to secure
improved prison conditions. 297 In Colorado, a state court entered a consent
decree regarding conditions of confinement and speeding up of the parole
process. 298 In Connecticut, a federal court entered a settlement agreement
between those in correctional custody and the state department of corrections.
The state department of corrections agreed to improve conditions, make best
efforts to release vulnerable people, and cooperate with a five-member
monitoring panel charged with supervising the remedies. 299
***
As COVID-19 exploded across the country, it forced courts to reconcile the
health of people in custody with competing interests. Before we draw more
generalized conclusions about the litigation, a few observations about the
decisional law stand out. Across right-remedy combinations, the proximity to
crime seemed to matter quite a bit; people in ICE custody mounted the most
successful class action cases, followed by those in pretrial detention. Detainees
convicted of crimes faced the longest odds. Judges generally erred on the side of
limited relief, leaning when possible on individualized statutory remedies or
limited constitutional holdings in favor of narrow, vulnerable sub-classes. Judges
were especially reluctant to make substantive medical judgments, and they
incorporated the CDC Interim Guidance as a standard of care.
III.
THREE CONCLUSIONS
In Part III, we draw three descriptive conclusions from the observations we
recited in Part II, and each has implications for the way American institutions
design legal responses to pandemics. First, the judicial response to COVID-19
296. Jordan Wilkie, Special Master to Make NC Prisons Comply, CAROLINA PUB. PRESS (Dec.
4, 2020), https://carolinapublicpress.org/40366/special-master-to-make-nc-prisons-comply-with-courtorders-during-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/72BE-9PUZ]; N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Cooper,
No. 20 CVS 500110 (Gen. Ct. Just. Super. Ct. June 16, 2020) (preliminary injunction).
297. See Coleman v. Newsom, 455 F. Supp. 3d 926, 931 (E.D. Cal. 2020).
298. See Tracy Harmon, Prison Coronavirus Protocols Mark Lawsuit Settlement Agreement,
PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.chieftain.com/story/news/2020/11/25/state-prisonofficials-and-aclu-staff-settle-virus-safety-lawsuit/6346357002/
[https://perma.cc/Z2MV-Z5EG]
(describing decree).
299. See Kelan Lyons, ACLU: CT Prisons Not Complying with Terms of COVID Lawsuit
Settlement, CT POST (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.ctpost.com/news/coronavirus/article/ACLU-CTprisons-not-complying-with-terms-of-15684871.php [https://perma.cc/E369-GGA4] (describing
agreement).
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in America’s detention facilities conformed to theories about how courts
recalibrate rights in view of expected remedies and vice versa. Second, the
judicial response was unusually dependent on the efficient operation and
compliance of sclerotic and under-funded bureaucracies. Third, the judicial
response reflected deeply entrenched assumptions about detainee danger and the
equal moral worth of people in America’s prisons. These assumptions are shared
by executive and legislative actors, who also failed to intervene. All three of
these conclusions suggest a broader point: a better judicial response to the next
pandemic will require better tools and better institutional partners.
A. Calibrating Equilibrium
The COVID-19 prisoner litigation was a moment of profound re-calibration
of right and remedy, and the adjustment happened quickly. The decisions evince
widespread discomfort with the relief projected for the incumbent right-remedy
combinations. These incumbent combinations were not configured with an eye
to pandemic threat and would have produced broad and potentially unpopular
discharge. Reflecting a desire not to be the institutional bearer of that decisionmaking responsibility, judges often avoided intrusive relief by changing the way
crucial rights and remedies were defined and applied.
1. Background on Remedial Equilibration
We generally agree with the view that rights and remedies do not develop
in silos; there is no such thing as a Platonic right that “exists” independent of
real-world implementation and enforcement. 300 Without wading too far into the
outer-most registers of the debate over “rights essentialism,” 301 we start from a
premise that the matrix of remedial implementation can influence the
development of rights and vice versa.
Even those familiar with Professor Daryl Levinson’s canonical attack on
rights essentialism might forget that one of the primary case studies in that work
was federal judicial oversight of prison conditions. 302 Over time, the remedial
initiative of district judges caused the Supreme Court to reduce the wattage of
the underlying constitutional rights. 303 Remedies based on Eighth Amendment

300. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999) (setting forth leading framework for thinking about rights-remedies
equilibrium); see also Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 678–79, 679 (1983)
(describing it as “inevitable that thoughts of remedy will affect thoughts of right, that judges’ minds will
shuttle back and forth between right and remedy”).
301. See Levinson, supra note 300, at 858 (defining phenomenon); see also, e.g., Owen M. Fiss,
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 52 (1979) (offering account of right-remedy
relationship often described as essentialist).
302. See Levinson, supra note 300, at 878–82.
303. See id. at 881 (“Expansive district court structural reform of prisons where conditions are
not chronically or severely unconscionable has provoked the Supreme Court to curtail the scope of the
right.”).
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violations placed federal district judges in receivership roles that made the
modern Court especially uncomfortable. 304 The Court responded by upping the
deliberate-indifference showing necessary to trigger remedial authority. 305 The
process by which remedies and rights influence one another is complex and
mediated by the rules and practices of both national and sub-national actors. But
the important point is that a seemingly broad right can trigger remedy-shrinking
behavior from judges, executives, and legislatures. And seemingly broad
remedies can cause lawmaking institutions to shrink rights.
The COVID-19 prisoner litigation demonstrates the more traditional
process by which a constitutional right of uncomfortable breadth causes remedial
restriction. 306 It also demonstrates the process by which the fear of broad
remedies prompts restrictive interpretations of the right. 307 These processes were
expressed in several interrelated judicial tendencies: to conduct risk tradeoffs
through more individualized non-constitutional remedies; 308 to adopt procedural
rules that avoided constitutional interpretation; 309 to focus any constitutional
relief on people in non-criminal detention who were perceived to pose less
danger; 310 to triage remedies towards the most medically vulnerable people; 311
and to increase the influence of and raise the bar for “deliberate indifference” so
as to spare detention facilities the costs of court-ordered safety improvements. 312
We discuss these tendencies below.
2. Remedies
Virtually every remedial shift reduced expected relief—sometimes in the
form of delay—when time was of the essence. To achieve such a shift, some
courts would thicken remedial limitations on class-action litigation, especially
for plaintiff classes seeking discharge. 313 Federal courts usually cut off discharge
pathways that avoided the PLRA, and then interpreted PLRA’s remedial limits
restrictively. 314 In the limited instances where they entertained a discharge
request without subjecting it to the PLRA, they often found ways to reproduce
preclusive exhaustion requirements. 315

304. See id.
305. See infra notes 332 to 340 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Part III.A.2.
307. See supra Part III.A.3.
308. See supra notes 211 to 229 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 241 to 261 and accompanying text.
310. See supra Part II.A.3.
311. See, e.g., supra notes 256 to 259 and accompanying text (explaining such an approach for
those in ICE detention).
312. See infra notes 332 to 340 and accompanying text.
313. See supra Part II.A.1.
314. See, e.g., supra notes 192 to 194 and accompanying text (non-PLRA pathways); infra notes
316 to 319 and accompanying text (PLRA remedial limits).
315. See supra note 196 and accompanying text; infra note 321 and accompanying text.
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Again, the PLRA contains strict limits on litigation seeking “prisoner
release orders,” including a thick exhaustion requirement and extended process
before idiosyncratic three-judge federal tribunals. 316 Statutorily excepted from
these requirements are “habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or
duration of confinement in prison.” 317 Even when detainee classes sought release
in what they denominated as habeas petitions, many courts simply ruled that a
habeas request for such relief did not “challeng[e] the fact or duration of
confinement.” 318 And once they held that detainee-class litigation was subject to
the PLRA, courts generally refused to relax the PLRA release-order prohibitions
or (in changed-condition suits) exhaustion requirements. 319 There were some
exceptions for scenarios where the procedure that required exhausting was
wholly unavailable. 320 Even when courts treated detainee-class complaints as
habeas litigation, judges still read procedural doctrines in ways that thwarted
meaningful collective relief. For example, they applied prudential exhaustion
requirements or held that person-to-person variation in habeas claims precluded
class treatment entirely. 321
The treatment of habeas discharge litigation illustrates a broader
phenomenon, too: courts simply avoided remedies that required them to reach
constitutional questions at all. If they were available, courts flocked to nonconstitutional remedies for health-and-safety risks, and those non-constitutional
remedies tended to reinforce the individual scale of relief. 322 In pretrial litigation,
for example, many courts relied on the statutory provisions permitting
individualized release for health risk. 323 Courts generally discharged people
convicted of crimes using individualized provisions for compassionate release
or home confinement. 324

316. These are actually two stacked requirements. There is one provision that formally requires
administrative exhaustion for all cases subject to the PLRA, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, and another that
requires the failure of a less intrusive remedial order when a prisoner seeks discharge, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(3).
317. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).
318. Id. § 3626(a)(3).
319. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 804–05 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding administrative
procedure sufficiently speedy and accessible so as to not to disable exhaustion requirement under the
statute).
320. See, e.g., McPherson v. Lamont, 457 F. Supp. 3d 67, 76 (D. Ct. 2020) (concluding
exhaustion futile for reasons including risk that inmates would contract COVID-19 prior to completing
process); Maney v. Brown, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1207 (D. Or. 2020) (“Based on the current record, the
Court concludes that ODOC’s administrative grievance procedure is currently unavailable for the relief
Plaintiffs seek in this case, and therefore exhaustion is not required for Plaintiffs to proceed on their
Section 1983 claims.”).
321. See supra Part II.A.1.
322. See supra Part II.A.2.
323. See supra notes 215, 217 to 221 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 222 to 225 and accompanying text.
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3. Rights
When courts reached constitutional issues—either because remedial
limitations were insufficiently preclusive or because statutory substitutes were
unavailable (ICE detention)—they stingily applied the constitutional rights, both
generally and especially in criminal detention cases. Courts readily accepted that
the virus entailed objective risk, given its spread and severity. 325 The most
significant mechanism for shrinkage was the deliberate-indifference
requirement, which judges applied in non-criminal contexts and defined to
impose a higher intent threshold.
In Farmer v. Brennan, 326 the Court held that, “even if the harm ultimately
was not averted,” there is not an Eighth Amendment violation if officials were
merely negligent, and so officials must recklessly disregard the risk before
detainees may obtain Eighth Amendment relief. 327 Under Farmer, deliberate
indifference can exist on something less than “acts or omissions for the very
purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” 328 Negligence
alone does not support a finding of constitutional harm, but Farmer made clear
that knowing risk and failing to respond reasonably does. Farmer established
that there is deliberate indifference when prisoners “face a substantial risk of
serious harm and [when detention officials] disregard[] that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it.” 329
Judges subtly restricted the constitutional right in two ways. The first was
not so much about the content of the deliberate-indifference rule as it was about
the scope of its application. The deliberate-indifference framework was
established to separate hard treatment into categories of acceptable and
unacceptable punishment. COVID-19 accelerated a trend in which courts applied
the framework in non-criminal detention contexts, where the Constitution
forbids punishment entirely. The deliberate-indifference framework thereby
displaced the Bell framework, which was the due process test ordinarily used to
analyze non-criminal custody.
The second way judges subtly restricted underlying rights was by shifting
the meaning of deliberate indifference itself. Almost all courts recognized the
general threat that COVID-19 posed, and most recognized the threat to detention
facilities. 330 Where courts insisted on applying the deliberate-indifference
framework, the presence of constitutional harm turned on what health-protective
responses precluded a deliberate-indifference finding. In Farmer’s terms, the

325. See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 840 (6th Cir. 2020) (finding that the respondents
were aware of the risk of COVID-19 where fifty-nine inmates and forty-six staff tested positive, and six
people incarcerated in the facility had died); see also supra notes 178 to 185 and accompanying text.
326. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
327. Id. at 844–45.
328. Id. at 835.
329. Id. at 847.
330. See supra notes 175 to 181 and accompanying text.
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constitutional harm turned on how one defines “reasonable measures” to abate
viral risk. In some cases, lower courts essentially reasoned that the sheer
magnitude of pandemic risk, and awareness thereof, meant that the failure to take
sufficiently health-protective measures was recklessly indifferent, 331 which is
consistent with the way Farmer defined the concept. These cases, however, were
more exception than rule.
Deliberate indifference requires awareness of risk and a failure to respond
reasonably. Many judges simply converted this carefully crafted definition into
a requirement of subjective intent or knowledge. 332 The most extreme version of
this view was captured in Wragg v. Ortiz, 333 with the court reasoning that, if
detention officials “subjectively believe their containment measures are the best
they can do,” the Eighth Amendment inquiry is over. 334 That interpretation of
deliberate indifference—ratcheting up the necessary showing to a level well
beyond recklessness—is unfaithful to Farmer and makes relief far more difficult
to obtain. Subjective intent is extremely difficult to prove because the defending
party typically has exclusive control of the crucial information regarding mental
state. 335 Moreover, that party is often the beneficiary of presumptions about
candor and regularity. 336
Judges using the deliberate-indifference framework also narrowed the
constitutional rights by odd reference to judicially intuited side constraints. In
331. See, e.g., Banks v. Booth, 459 F. Supp. 3d 143, 157–59 (D.D.C. 2020) (finding that the
plaintiffs established a likelihood of success in showing deliberate indifference where they provided
evidence that the defendants “are aware of the risk that COVID-19 poses to Plaintiffs’ health and have
disregarded those risks by failing to take comprehensive, timely, and proper steps to stem the spread of
the virus”).
332. See, e.g., Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he district court cited
no evidence to establish that the defendants subjectively believed the measures they were taking were
inadequate.”); Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 802 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Though the district court cited
the Defendants’ general awareness of the dangers posed by COVID-19, it cited no evidence that they
subjectively believe the measures they are taking are inadequate.”); Maney v. Brown, 464 F. Supp. 3d
1191, 1212 (D. Or. 2020) (“Plaintiffs do not cite to any evidence to establish that Defendants
‘subjectively believed the measures they were taking were inadequate.’” (internal citations omitted)).
333. 462 F. Supp. 3d. 476 (D.N.J. 2020).
334. Id. at 507.
335. See Michael Cameron Friedman, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of Prison
Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV. 921, 947 (1992)
(“As a practical matter, it is virtually impossible for . . . plaintiffs to prove the intent of prison
officials . . . .”); Mitchell O’Shea Carney, Cycles of Punishment: The Constitutionality of Restricting
Access to Menstrual Health Products in Prisons, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2541, 2580 (2020) (“[E]ven if [a]
decision was in part motivated by animus, the private nature of prison officials’ decisions makes it nearly
impossible to uncover the smoking gun evidence of intent that courts have found persuasive in the
past.”); see also Sharon Dolovich, Canons of Evasion in Constitutional Criminal Law, in THE NEW
CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 133 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) [hereinafter
Dolovich, Canons of Evasion] (calling attention to the “problem of other minds” in prisoner conditions
litigation).
336. See Friedman, supra note 335, at 947; David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming
the Conservative Legal Agenda, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2032, 2071 (2004); see also Dolovich, Canons of
Evasion, supra note 335, at 140–41 (discussing the effects of these things on the review of decisionmaking at detention facilities).
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many cases, they simply asked whether a detention site’s response was
reasonable in light of side constraints—without asking whether the side
constraints were themselves reasonable. Courts generally considered the absence
of bold action to be a reasonably practical constraint, so they usually rejected the
failure to take such action as a ground for a deliberate-indifference finding. 337
For example, courts often refused to find deliberate indifference when that
finding would have required broad discharge. A representative Eleventh Circuit
opinion emphasized that “the inability to take a positive action [in the form of
decarceration] likely does not constitute a state of mind more blameworthy than
negligence.” 338 Nor was this reasoning limited to refusal-to-decarcerate
scenarios. It carried the day in cases where plaintiffs alleged deliberate
indifference for failure to facilitate social distancing. 339 And despite the CDC
Interim Guidance providing that COVID-19 testing programs should include
asymptomatic prisoners, many judges found that a refusal to muster resources
necessary to do so was not deliberate indifference. Facilities simply could not be
expected to pay to conduct facility-wide testing. 340 Why not? Many courts
seemed uncomfortable answering that question.
4. Appellate Re-Calibration
Within a judicial system, appeals courts necessarily play policy-making
roles that trial courts do not. 341 The pattern of policy-making in pertinent
appellate decisions is consistent with the view that COVID-19 provoked recalibration. Across jurisdictions, appellate courts expressed discomfort with
versions of rights and remedies that would permit substantial relief in lower
courts, especially discharge.
Start with the U.S. Supreme Court. In Ahlman v. Orange County, the federal
district court had preliminarily enjoined practices in a jail housing 3,000

337. But see Banks v. Booth, 459 F. Supp. 3d 143, 158 (D.D.C. 2020) (where the court was aware
that circumstances might reveal relief to have been unnecessary, but nevertheless ordering partial relief
on the ground that the facility was “failing to take comprehensive, timely, and proper steps to stem the
spread of the virus”).
338. Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
339. See, e.g., Plata v. Newsom, 445 F. Supp. 3d 557, 563–64 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (finding that
where defendants did not implement social distancing, they were not deliberately indifferent because
they “implemented several [other] measures”); Wragg v. Ortiz, 462 F. Supp. 3d. 476, 509 (D.N.J. 2020)
(“That physical distancing is not possible in a prison setting, as [Plaintiffs] urge, does not an Eighth
Amendment claim make.”).
340. See Wragg, 462 F. Supp. 3d. at 506. But see Savino v. Souza, 459 F. Supp. 3d 317, 331–32
(D. Mass. 2020) (finding that the failure to test more than twenty detainees, or conduct any contact
tracing, would likely qualify as deliberate indifference); Coreas v. Bounds, 457 F. Supp. 3d 460, 463
(D. Md. 2020) (finding that a “lack of any testing for COVID-19” constituted deliberate indifference
where the defendant had not “actually tested anyone to date”).
341. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Designated Diffidence: District Court Judges on
the Courts of Appeals, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 565, 568 (2001).
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prisoners, which had experienced over 300 cases. 342 Among the practices
forming the basis for the preliminary injunction were: crammed transportation;
insufficiently-distanced dayroom socializing, telephone communication, and
sleeping; failure to provide enough soap and other protective material;
widespread denial of diagnostic testing; and an inability to separate symptomatic
prisoners for treatment and subsequent isolation. 343 The district court found the
risk “undeniably high” and determined that any compliance with actual jail
policy was “piecemeal and inadequate.” 344 In entering the preliminary
injunction, the federal district court determined the facility likely violated the
Eighth Amendment and the ADA. 345 The Ninth Circuit twice refused to stay the
injunction. 346
The Supreme Court, however, stayed the injunction pending further
litigation, effectively mooting the remedy. 347 There was no reasoning of note in
the Court’s “shadow docket” order. 348 Four justices would have denied the
State’s application to dissolve the injunction. 349 Justice Sotomayor wrote a
dissent reciting the problems at the jail, emphasizing that the likelihood of
subsequent Supreme Court review was so low that the Court’s intervention was
unwarranted, and arguing the facility could not show irreparable harm. 350 Justice
Sotomayor summarized the record developed in the district court as follows:
[I]nmates described being transported back and forth to the jail in
crammed buses, socializing in dayrooms with no space to distance
physically, lining up next to each other to wait for the phone, sleeping
in bunk beds two to three feet apart, and even being ordered to stand
closer than six feet apart when inmates tried to socially distance. 351
Justice Sotomayor’s position in Ahlman is somewhat noteworthy because
it was Justice Sotomayor who had exercised in-chambers power to stay an
injunction against Elkton Federal Correctional Institution (FCI-Elkton) without
even referring the question to her colleagues. 352 (The Sixth Circuit later vacated
the injunction on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to show deliberate
indifference. 353) The difference in Justice Sotomayor’s view of the two cases

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

445 F. Supp. 3d 671, 679–80, 694–95 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
See id.
Id. at 688.
See id. at 691–92.
Ahlman v. Barnes, No. 20-55568, 2020 WL 3547960, at *1 (9th Cir. June 17, 2020).
See Barnes v. Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. 2620, 2620 (2020) (mem.).
See supra note 17.
See Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. at 2620.
See id. at 2621–22 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2621.
See Williams v. Wilson, 207 L. Ed. 2d 168 (2020) (mem.).
See Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 844 (6th Cir. 2020).
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may be explained by the fact that the Ahlman injunction was for changed
conditions, 354 whereas the FCI-Elkton injunction was for discharge. 355
The tendency of appeals courts to pare back trial-court relief was evident
in the decision-making of the federal circuits, too. We mentioned the FCI-Elkton
injunction, which the Sixth Circuit eventually vacated on the ground that there
was no deliberate indifference. 356 In another example, a federal district judge had
issued a preliminary injunction against Michigan’s Oakland County Jail, having
found that it had fallen short of the CDC Interim Guidance. 357 The Sixth Circuit
quickly vacated the district court’s injunction, however, concluding that the jail
had “responded reasonably” to COVID-19 and that there was no deliberate
indifference. 358 Indeed, there were instances of appeals courts stepping in to limit
trial remedies in the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. 359
We underscore that there is a meaningful inference to be drawn from the
results in appeals courts and from their necessary status as policy-makers. More
so than trial courts, appeals courts calibrate right and remedy in ways that control
subsequent inquiries in that jurisdiction. As a result, they order and deny relief
with an eye more towards what they believe to be a workable long-term
equilibrium. It is therefore unsurprising to see those courts engaged in more
conspicuous re-calibration by restricting the scope of the right or the remedy. We
are aware of no cases in which an appeals court awarded relief that a district
court denied.
354. See Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. at 2620 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
355. See Wilson, 961 F.3d at 844.
356. Id.
357. See Cameron v. Bouchard, 462 F. Supp. 3d 746, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2020), reconsidered by
No. 20-10949, 2020 WL 2615740 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2020), and vacated, 815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir.
2020).
358. See Cameron, 815 F. App’x at 988.
359. See, e.g., Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding that
immigration detainees failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the claim that government
was deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs); Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154, 162–66
(5th Cir. 2020) (granting a prison’s emergency motion for stay of preliminary injunction, finding the
district court had incorrectly applied the Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference standard); Marlowe
v. LeBlanc, 810 F. App’x. 302 (5th Cir. 2020) (staying a temporary restraining order regarding
conditions in a state prison, requiring compliance with that prison’s own internal policies and that the
prison submit a plan to ensure social distancing and hygiene practices); Cameron, 815 F. App’x. at 985
(vacating preliminary injunctive relief, citing Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020), and
finding that the jail “acted unreasonably” to prevent the spread of COVID-19); Wilson, 961 F.3d at 844–
45 (vacating the district court’s preliminary injunction, in a case brought by medically vulnerable federal
prisoners, holding that the petitioners had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their Eighth
Amendment claim, because they had not satisfied the subjective component of the deliberateindifference inquiry); Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2020) (partially staying the district
court’s preliminary injunction, finding that the district court failed to afford proper deference to the
Sheriff’s judgment regarding safety and security); Roman v. Wolf, No. 20-55436, 2020 WL 2188048,
at *1 (9th Cir. May 5, 2020) (staying a preliminary injunction except to the extent necessary to comply
with CDC Interim Guidance); Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding that the
district court erred in awarding injunctive relief because the jail could not be expected to do the
“impossible”).
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***
When COVID-19 hit America’s detention sites, courts were immediately
confronted with incumbent right-remedy combinations that, if straightforwardly
applied, would have required substantial intrusions on detention policy and
operations. Although judges leaned heavily on non-constitutional law tailored to
individualized inquiry, many still had to wrestle with how sincerely to honor
constitutional precedent configured for different risks. As one might expect, the
lower-court adjudication was quite deferential to detention authorities, but there
were cases deciding that detention conditions violated the Federal Constitution,
especially when the plaintiffs were in non-criminal custody. 360
Insofar as it was more hostile to broad constitutional relief, appellate
decision-making had a different feel. In cases where remedies involved intrusive
relief, senior tribunals dissolved health-protective TROs and preliminary
injunctions, stayed permanent injunctions pending appeal, ordered further
factfinding before deciding issues against jailers, interposed exhaustion rules,
and remanded for determinations pursuant to more deferential standards. 361
Simply put, the appellate courts limited the scope of winnable relief, either by
paring back substantive rights or by restricting remedies.
B. Bureaucratic Limitations
Prisoner-conditions adjudication was also defined by the institutional limits
of judicial action, evident when controlling law required courts to defer to and
work through sclerotic detention bureaucracies. Although orders to put people
behind bars require the state to overcome multiple institutional vetoes, 362 the
collective action problem works the other way thereafter. It may take a village
to imprison someone, 363 but it also takes a village to get them out. Courts had a
difficult time taking effective action because of bureaucratic friction up and
down the custody chain, both before and after moments of judicial intervention.
Multiple sites of resistance and dysfunction meant that securing timely judicial
relief at sufficient scale was exceptionally challenging.
Strategies that depend on coordinated and decisive bureaucratic initiative
are probably bad ones. Detention facilities are underfunded, and that shortfall
has clear effects on public health measures. 364 Correctional personnel are also
the lowest-status workers in law enforcement—with little training, high

360. See supra Part II.A.3.
361. See supra Part III.A.4.
362. To subject someone to criminal custody, for example, requires the effective sign off of
police, multiple prosecutors, a jury, and the judiciary.
363. Cf. Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass
Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 837 (2018) (commenting that “it takes a village to incarcerate
someone”).
364. See NAS Report, supra note 18, at 31.
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turnover, and lower pay. 365 The health and safety of people in custody are
therefore subject to the layered decision-making of a short-staffed and modestly
trained professional community with limited oversight and accountability. 366
COVID-related discharge often required the input of these frontline facility
officials, as well as records unit officers, mental health professionals, senior
corrections commissioners, prison physicians or other health providers capable
of giving appropriate referrals, parole commissioners, and risk panelists. 367 Even
at the highest levels, corrections leadership may lack a public health
background. 368
The bureaucratic ecosystem is often working at some institutional remove
from correctional leadership, which itself may lack any background in
responding to a public health crisis. Judicial activity that is predicated on the
functional operation of this ecosystem, particularly during exigent
circumstances, is at a significant disadvantage. Detention bureaucracies
complicated relief because they slowed the exhaustion that must usually be
completed before judicial intervention begins. Courts gave the health-and-safety
practices of detention facilities the deference that is typically accorded to
administrative action but did so in the absence of the expertise and administrative
process that justifies such deference in other settings. Moreover, much of the
judicial relief awarded was implemented, haltingly, by the problematic
bureaucracies themselves.
1. Bureaucracy and Exhaustion
On the front end, much of the relief available in federal courts requires that
detained complainants have exhausted institutional, administrative, and, in the
case of federal litigation, state judicial remedies. 369 Exhaustion often required
detainees to make futile requests that consumed precious time. If the exhaustion
requirements did not require that the detainees have received an adverse
decision, then they usually required them to wait until requests for relief timed
out. 370
365. See John J. Gibbons & Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement A Report of
the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 385, 485 (2006);
Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 666 n.119
(1993).
366. See Michele Deitch, Special Populations and the Importance of Prison Oversight, 37 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 291, 303–04 (2010).
367. See Kovarsky, supra note 3, at 86 n.84.
368. See Keri Blakinger, Prisons Have a Health Care Issue—And it Starts at the Top, Critics
Say, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 1, 2021), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2021/07/01/prisonshave-a-health-care-issue-and-it-starts-at-the-top-critics-say [https://perma.cc/2VDB-C2UH].
369. See supra notes 156 to 166, 194 to 196, 203 to 207, 232, 315 to 316, 319 to 321 and
accompanying text.
370. Cf, e.g., Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[A]vailable
administrative remedies are exhausted when the time limits for the prison’s response set forth in the
prison Grievance Procedures have expired.”), overruled on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d
785 (5th Cir. 2012).
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Moving a detainee expeditiously through the administrative process
necessary to exhaust a claim requires multiple moments of bureaucratic
initiative. Delay by any actor in the chain slows exhaustion and any judicial relief
contingent thereupon. 371 Exhaustion requirements may be particularly
insurmountable during a pandemic, when overwhelmed prison administrators
will struggle to respond on timetables necessary to afford meaningful relief. For
example, in the federal system, many compassionate release requests went
unanswered for months. When they were answered, they were typically
denied. 372
2. Bureaucracy and Deference
Deference models that operate on assumptions about administrative
deliberation and expertise create another problem. 373 Not only do deference
practices bake in assumptions about the integrity of the administrative process
and the desirability of its outcomes, 374 they also perpetuate a longstanding
tradition of deference to the public health decision-making of local and state
authorities. 375 Deference to a single detention site’s policies, moreover, has
historically been a signal requirement of the pertinent decisional law. 376 During
the pandemic, however, the predicates for routinized deference were absent. The
faith typically placed in administrative leadership became rather unjustified—as
one might expect when the object of deference was the ability of prison officials
to manage once-in-a-lifetime pandemic risk.
Whereas deference to administrative expertise would ordinarily be justified
on the theory that science should be privileged in the decision-making, 377 the
deference to the CDC Interim Guidance appeared to have the opposite effect.
Judges fixated on the Interim Guidance—which was general, minimalist, and

371. See Andrea C. Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind? Enhancing Public Transparency of
Penal Institutions, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 461 (2014); Kovarsky, supra note 3, at 88 nn.84–85
and accompanying text.
372. See Keri Blakinger & Joseph Neff, Thousands of Sick Federal Prisoners Sought
Compassionate Release. 98 Percent Were Denied, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/10/07/thousands-of-sick-federal-prisoners-soughtcompassionate-release-98-percent-were-denied [https://perma.cc/7K2A-93QM]; Blakinger & Neff,
supra note 91 and accompanying text.
373. See Eric Berger, Comparative Capacity and Competence, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 215, 236
(2020).
374. See id. at 234.
375. See Andrew Brunsden, Hepatitis C in Prisons: Evolving Toward Decency Through
Adequate Medical Care and Public Health Reform, 54 UCLA L. REV. 465, 497 (2006); Friedman, supra
note 335, at 947–48.
376. See Dolovich, The Failed Regulation and Oversight of American Prisons, supra note 29
(manuscript at 5.13 to .15).
377. See Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV.
207, 241 (1984); Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1727 (2011).
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precatory 378—as a scientific lodestar. 379 Setting aside its generality and
nonmandatory status, the Interim Guidance was inadequate because it was not
paired with the need to reduce overcrowding—a pairing that WHO and NAS
reports emphasized. 380 The CDC largely deferred to correctional authorities in
its reluctance to touch on release as they key mechanism to permit social
distancing, and then judges reaffirmed that deference. Judges, in short, used the
Interim Guidance as a means to discount information presented by most other
public health experts. 381
3. Bureaucracy and Process
The struggles associated with the intense bureaucratic presence were
nowhere more evident than when courts had to enforce bureaucratic compliance.
Under these circumstances, judicial interventions were aimed at the bureaucratic
substructure necessary to produce health-protective outcomes rather than in the
form of orders for discharge or changed conditions per se. Many of these
interventions placed judges in precisely the ongoing receivership roles that have
historically made the Supreme Court uncomfortable. 382 Recall Gayle v. Meade,
in which a federal court had to appoint a Special Master just to ensure that an
ICE facility complied with prior remedial orders. 383
The need for judges to guarantee the integrity of bureaucratic decisionmaking was especially prominent in several pieces of litigation attacking
practices at federal correctional institutions. Some of the formal legal rules in the
federal system were favorable, at least for certain detainee categories seeking
individualized relief. The First Step Act, enacted in 2018, had already created
new avenues for compassionate release. 384 In March 2020, the CARES Act
vested the Justice Department with other broad discharge powers built on
existing home confinement and compassionate release authority. 385 With respect
to home confinement, the Attorney General issued implementing directives to
the BOP, ordering federal correctional facilities to use the new statutory tools to
secure protection for older people with preexisting medical conditions. 386
Memorializing those directives in April, the U.S. Attorney General singled out

378. See supra notes 79 to 86 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 264 to 273 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 73 to 76 and accompanying text.
381. See id.
382. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
383. See Gayle v. Meade, No. 20-21553, 2020 WL 4047334, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2020).
384. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
385. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
§ 12003(b)(2), 134 Stat. 281, 516 (2020).
386. See Clare Hymes, Barr Tells Federal Prisons to Send Inmates Home in Response to
Coronavirus Outbreak, CBS NEWS (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/attorney-generalwilliam-barr-bureau-of-prisons-send-inmates-home-coronavirus-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/T86EV7CF].
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the need for expeditious action at FCI-Oakdale (LA), FCI-Danbury (CT), and
FCI-Elkton (OH). 387
Despite discharge-friendlier authority, bureaucratic resistance within the
BOP quickly necessitated judicial involvement. At the top levels, BOP further
limited the statutorily identified groups eligible for home confinement 388 and
gave limited guidance as to how to use the compassionate release provisions in
COVID-19 cases. 389 There was substantial friction at lower bureaucratic levels,
too. A federal judge had to issue a temporary restraining order against FCIDanbury, which failed “to take [the Attorney General’s order and corresponding
legislation] seriously.” 390 At that facility, there were 241 compassionate release
applications during the first six weeks of the COVID-19 emergency, and none
were granted. 391 A federal judge called the BOP’s discharge procedures
“Kafkaesque.” 392
Even when subject to a judicial order, some facilities “made only minimal
effort to get at-risk inmates out of harm’s way,” 393 and the appetite for ongoing
judicial enforcement was less than an inch deep. A month after a federal judge
issued a preliminary injunction against FCI-Elkton, the warden had still failed to
discharge a single person. 394 The federal district court entered another order
further directing compliance, but that order was stayed pending appeal by the
U.S. Supreme Court and later reversed by the Sixth Circuit. 395 When a federal
judge dismissed a comparable suit about activity at FCI-Oakdale, she disparaged
the class action as an attempt to make her a “de facto ‘super’ warden.” 396

387. See Memorandum from William Barr, Att’y Gen., to the Dir. of Bureau of Prisons 1 (Apr.
3,
2020),
https://www.politico.com/20/f/?id=00000171-4255-d6b1-a3f1-c6d51b810000
[https://perma.cc/7MS9-FD8F].
388. See COVID-19 Action Plan: Phase Five, supra note 90.
388. See Clare Hymes, Amid COVID-19 Threat, Inmates and Families Confused by Federal
Guidance
on
Home
Confinement
Release,
CBS
NEWS
(Apr.
24,
2020),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amid-covid-19-threat-inmates-and-families-confused-by-federalguidance-on-home-confinement-release/ [https://perma.cc/9QCD-6DL8].
389. Compassionate release legislation permitted officials to release individuals if “extraordinary
and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See also Wilson v.
Williams, No. 20-cv-00794, 2020 WL 2542131, at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 19, 2020) (describing BOP
guidance on compassionate release criteria, consisting of a list of non-exclusive factors), vacated, No.
20-cv-00794, 2020 WL 1910481 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2020).
390. Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 415 (D. Conn. 2020).
391. See id.
392. United States v. Scparta, No. 18-CR-578, 2020 WL 1910481, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20,
2020).
393. Wilson,, 2020 WL 2542131, at *2.
394. See id.
395. See Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020) (appellate disposition); Williams v.
Wilson, 207 L. Ed. 2d 168 (2020) (mem.).
396. Livas v. Myers, 455 F. Supp. 3d 272, 283 (W.D.La. 2020).
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C. Detention Exceptionalism
The pandemic required legal institutions to rethink the operation of several
constitutional rights, yet there is something unique in the tone and decisionmaking of COVID-19 detention cases. We strongly suspect this “detention
exceptionalism” was attributable to entrenched beliefs about the safety risks
posed by, and moral worth attributed to, people in American detention facilities.
One does not have to look hard to find supportive evidence.
Compare the Supreme Court treatment of detainees’ rights with its
treatment of personal rights in other stress-tested contexts. In Roman Catholic
Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 397 the Supreme Court voted 5-4 to enjoin
enforcement of a New York rule concerning occupancy limits for religious
services. 398 The New York rule had limited the permissible size of religious
gatherings, which were in turn pegged to the size of the physical space
involved. 399 As mentioned, the Court acknowledged that its justices “are not
public health experts” and that they should “respect the judgment of those with
special expertise and responsibility in this area,” but nonetheless declared that
“even in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten.” 400 In
a noticeable deviation from a pattern of minimalist intervention on constitutional
issues, the Court decided the matter even though New York had already relaxed
restrictions to permit larger religious gatherings. 401
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, and the general category of decisionmaking associated with it, 402 demonstrates a contrast between the treatment of
constitutional rights in detention litigation and in other contexts. Vulnerable
detainees, incapable of protecting themselves through autonomous decisionmaking, bear partially enforced constitutional rights. Meanwhile, religious
groups, capable of self-protection, can expect full enforcement of rights to
religious practice and expression—justified by grand references to the
uncompromising application of constitutional principles during emergencies.
We believe that such detainee exceptionalism reflects the views that: (1) people
who have spent time in custody pose a substantially elevated danger to the
community; and (2) the health of such people is somehow worth less than the
health of other community members.

397. 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020).
398. See id. at 69.
399. See id. at 66.
400. Id. at 68.
401. See id.
402. Exemptions from generally applicable health-and-safety rules are gaining traction in the
lower courts, too. Relying on Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, the Sixth Circuit—which vacated
the FCI-Elkton remedies—preliminarily enjoined the Toledo County Public School District’s generally
applicable order closing school facilities because it resulted in closing religious schools. See Monclova
Christian Acad. v. Toledo-Lucas Cnty. Health Dept., No. 20-4300 (6th Cir. Dec. 31, 2020).
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1. The Perception of Danger
Inflated perception of safety risk plays a clear role in release practices
across institutions. By “perceived safety risk,” we describe the perceived risk of
releasing a detainee into the general population. Perception of safety risk would,
for instance, explain the relative litigation success enjoyed by ICE detainees and
the relative failures experienced by those in custody because they were convicted
of crimes. 403
The literature critical of mass incarceration shares a common empirical
insight: the American public and the institutions that translate its punishment
preferences over-estimate the criminality that detention averts. 404 Imprisonment
does not perform any offense-reduction functions nearly as well as people once
believed—not with respect to the incapacitation or specific deterrence of the
person in custody, nor with respect to the general deterrence of other people. 405
These effects are clearly non-existent when the imprisonment is some increment
of an already-long sentence and when it involves an older detainee. 406
Nevertheless, the belief that more detention improves public safety persists, 407
and it explains why even the broadest decarceration initiatives often exclude
sentence reductions for people convicted of violent offenses. 408
Indeed, perceptions of safety threat seemed to drive certain decisionmaking patterns. Recall that courts were most willing to invoke constitutional
law and to order collective discharge in ICE detention cases, 409 where the
purpose of detention was not to punish or otherwise prevent criminality but to
ensure review of alleged immigration violations. On the other hand, courts were
least willing to intervene in cases involving people convicted of crimes and
sentenced to prison time. They were willing to order individualized release in
certain cases, but the pace and mix of releases demonstrate that perception of
recidivism risk remained a major driver of judicial intervention.
The danger-constrained approach to prison discharge severely limited the
response to pandemic risk because it limited the ability to sufficiently
403. See supra Part II.A.3.
404. Cf., e.g., Jennifer E. Copp, The Impact of Incarceration on the Risk of Violent Recidivism,
103 MARQ. L. REV. 775, 782 (2020) (summarizing modern research on the relationship between
imprisonment and recidivism as “suggest[ing] that prison is not more effective than non-custodial
sanctions at reducing recidivism”); Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Subjective Well-Being, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
1753, 1772 (2015) (referring to “accumulating empirical evidence” that suggests smaller-than-believed
causal relationship between incarceration and deterrence).
405. See Mirko Bagaric, Dan Hunter & Gabrielle Wolf, Technological Incarceration and the End
of the Prison Crisis, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73, 94–95 (2018).
406. See Guyora Binder & Ben Notterman, Penal Incapacitation: A Situationist Critique, 54 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2017) (lengthening sentences); John Monahan, Jennifer Skeem & Christopher
Lowenamp, Age, Risk Assessment, and Sanctioning: Overestimating the Old, Underestimating the
Young, 41 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 191, 192 (2017) (older offenders).
407. See Binder & Notterman, supra note 406, at 30.
408. See J.J. Prescott, Benjamin Pyle & Sonja B. Starr, Understanding Violent-Crime Recidivism,
95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1643, 1643 n.1 (2020) (collecting sources).
409. See supra Part II.A.3.

174

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110:117

decarcerate. Judges can order statutory discharge only for detainees that the
legislature has declared eligible for such relief. 410 Most releases therefore
involved older people or medically vulnerable people convicted of lesser
crimes. 411 But most people who are convicted and serving prison time do not
have that profile; they are serving longer sentences for violent or otherwise
serious criminality. 412 Under criteria adopted by many states, for example,
people incarcerated for violent crimes are simply ineligible for early release. 413
And although courts were willing to order individualized release for
convicted detainees, they were categorically unwilling to order remedies that
would have required broader discharge. They refused to order discharge per
se, 414 and they were extraordinarily reluctant to order health-protective practices
to which prisons objected on security grounds. 415 Opinions refusing relief against
prisons are replete with non-specific concerns about safety risks and generally
fail to grapple with the empirical fact that those concerns are grossly
exaggerated. It, therefore, comes as no surprise that prisons were uniquely unable
to achieve the population reduction necessary to slow COVID-19 spread. 416
The decisional treatment of jails and other sites of pretrial detention lands
somewhere between that of ICE and post-conviction facilities, but it still
demonstrates the judicial focus on perceived safety risk. In 1984, Congress
expressly directed federal courts to consider public safety in pretrial bail
determinations, and the Supreme Court approved that criterion three years
later. 417 A great deal of data nonetheless captures how poorly judicial officials
predict the pretrial risk and how heavily those officials err on the side of

410. See, e.g., Dara Lind, The Prison Was Built to Hold 1,500 Inmates. It Had Over 2,000
Coronavirus Cases, PROPUBLICA (June 18, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-prison-wasbuilt-to-hold-1500-inmates-it-had-over-2000-coronavirus-cases
[https://perma.cc/5MMA-KPB6]
(explaining that Ohio’s vulnerable prisoner population “did not hugely benefit from the release policy”
because “governors and state legislatures are still afraid to release violent criminals even if their crimes
were committed decades ago” and because “[t]he prisoners most vulnerable to the coronavirus are
among the least likely to be released by either emergency clemency or many reform bills”).
411. See, e.g., Ann E. Marimow, Sick, Elderly Prisoners Are at Risk for COVID-19. A New D.C.
Law Makes it Easier for Them to Seek Early Release, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/sick-elderly-inmates-coronavirusrelease/2020/12/29/5342816c-3fcd-11eb-8db8-395dedaaa036_story.html
[https://perma.cc/L9QA7DPJ].
412. See Prescott et al., supra note 408, at 1648; see also 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at
57–58 (concluding that there is “little evidence” that parole release, compassionate release, or other early
release measures successfully reduced prison populations).
413. See Cecelia Klingele, Labeling Violence, 103 MARQ. L. REV. 847 (2020); see also Mirko
Bagaric, Gabrielle Wolf & Daniel McCord, Nothing Seemingly Works in Sentencing: Not Mandatory
Penalties; Not Discretionary Penalties—But Science Has the Answer, 53 IND. L. REV. 499, 523 (2020)
(discussing with respect to federal prisoners).
414. See supra Part II.A.1.
415. See, e.g., supra notes 338 to 340 and accompanying text (discussing refusal to order
remedies that required decarceration, which reflects generalized intuitions about public safety).
416. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 56–57.
417. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1984).
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detention. 418 Releasing tranches of pretrial detainees poses little threat to public
safety, 419 but judicial intervention in American jails remained quite sensitive to
exaggerated risk. 420
All of this is to say that, as we begin to search for reasons why courts
second-classed rights to detainee health and safety, we can think of a good place
to start looking. The pattern of COVID-19 detainee decisions reflects a
longstanding and generalized idea that releasing people from correctional
custody poses broad safety risks. Enforcement of established rights against
health risk crashed into an extremely well-defined interest in the release
avoidance fueling incarceration as a public safety strategy. The enforcement of
every right involves a tradeoff with some countervailing interest. But few of
those interests are as triggering as “the community’s” safety from people accused
or convicted of criminality.
2. The Value of Detainees
The other pillar of detention exceptionalism centers on the moral worth of
those in detention—specifically, the American tendency to treat such people as
less worthy of investment and protection. 421 It is fairly well established that,
when people assert that incarceration improves public safety, they mean safety
of the unincarcerated public. 422 To the extent that prior criminality predicts
future offending, placing those who have committed crimes behind bars does not
prevent crime so much as it does change where it happens. 423 And to the extent

418. See generally Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 439,
469–75 (2020) (discussing the adoption of risk-assessment tools to predict danger in pretrial decisionmaking); Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497 (2012)
(collecting sources showing that judges predict pretrial crime poorly and noting the potential of
algorithmic risk assessment instruments); Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines,
98 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1280 (2018) (discussing the role of algorithmically-augmented prediction as
central to bail reform).
419. See Tiana Herring, Releasing People Pretrial Doesn’t Harm Public Safety, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/11/17/pretrial-releases/
[https://perma.cc/HN26-NVFR] (collecting studies).
420. See, e.g., Doug Colbert & Colin Starger, Bail Injustice in the Time of COVID-19, BALT.
SUN (Sep. 7, 2020), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-op-0906-bail-reform20200907-crgclw6s4jhavmmtdks4ebniqm-story.html [https://perma.cc/6LD4-D6MP] (documenting
phenomenon in Maryland bail proceedings).
421. See generally Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY
J. CRIM. L. 259 (2011) [hereinafter Dolovich, Exclusion and Control] (linking mass carceral practices
to a general view of prisoners’ sub-humanity); Dolovich, The Failed Regulation and Oversight of
American Prisons, supra note 29 (manuscript at 5.16) (“Any adequate explanations for this state of
affairs must involve reckoning with the moral value—or, more aptly, the moral disvalue—American
society collectively ascribes to the lives and well-being of people in prison.”).
422. See Dolovich, Exclusion and Control, supra note 421, at 272–74.
423. See Susan Dimock, Criminalizing Dangerousness: How to Preventively Detain Dangerous
Offenders, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 537, 540 (2015).
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that criminality is situational, 424 incarceration is just as likely to increase crime
as it is to suppress it; detention is criminogenic. 425
The notion that incarceration improves social safety persists not because of
robust empirical support, but because society cares less about the disutility of
crime victims who are accused or convicted of criminality. As Professors Guyora
Binder and Ben Notterman put it, “Since incapacitation strategies do not achieve
utility, it seems probable that they have prevailed and persist[] because of their
distributive or expressive effects.” 426 Americans accept such distribution and
expression because, to put things bluntly, they accept that people in custody are
“without equal moral or political standing.” 427 There are profound race and class
dimensions to this equilibrium—given the scale, demography, and history of
American detention. 428
And so it is with COVID-19. 429 Notwithstanding the overwhelming risk
associated with infection in such crowded and under-protected environments,
American institutions resist discharge by vague reference to public safety and
without reference to the racialized patterns of harm to vulnerable populations. 430
It seems difficult to argue that such references to public safety involve any
rigorous utilitarian calculation. COVID-19 presents health risks to detention
communities (and those around them) that almost certainly swamp risks
associated with discharge. Instead, these references to safety reflect a
longstanding American practice of discounting the interests and moral worth of
people in government custody. In the influenced discourse and decision-making,
the damage to detainee populations simply matters less than damage to other
communities. 431

424. See Binder & Notterman, supra note 406, at 32–34.
425. See Joshua C. Cochran, Daniel P. Mears & William D. Bales, Assessing the Effectiveness of
Correctional Sanctions, 30 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 317 (2014).
426. Binder & Notterman, supra note 406, at 43.
427. Dolovich, Exclusion and Control, supra note 421, at 330.
428. See 2020 NAS REPORT, supra note 18, at 23 (“[A]dmission to and release from incarceration
are spatially concentrated in low-income, predominantly Black and Hispanic neighborhoods. . . . In
addition to their socioeconomic disadvantage, people at greatest risk of incarceration are also in poor
health, burdened disproportionately by chronic health conditions.”).
429. Professor Dolovich draws a similar conclusion about some of the judicial response. See
Dolovich, Mass Incarceration, Meet Covid-19, supra note 3, at 5.
430. See, e.g., Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2020) (invoking safety risks); cf. also
Eric Reinhart & Daniel L. Chen, Carceral-Community Epidemiology, Structural Racism, and COVID19 Disparities, 118 PNAS 1, 1 (2021) (“Given disproportionate policing and incarceration of racialized
residents nationally, the criminal punishment system may explain a large proportion of racial COVID19 disparities noted across the United States.”).
431. See Dolovich, Exclusion and Control, supra note 421, at 330–31. Pursuant to what Professor
Dolovich has called America’s “carceral bargain,” see Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the
Eighth Amendment, supra note 132, at 892, society chooses imprisonment not to deter or to incapacitate
or to exact retribution, but to forget. And forgetting is easier when the humanity of detainees is
diminished, which in turn reduces the bargained-for obligations of the detaining state.
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CONCLUSION
The way courts enforced detainee-protective rights and remedies during the
pandemic was markedly different from how they enforced other constitutional
rules. Imagine if, in Ahlman (the Orange County jail case), the U.S. Supreme
Court had applied the same logic it used in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn
(the New York religious practice case). The prisoners-rights opinion would have
emphasized that, during a pandemic, an order refusing relief “would lead to
irreparable injury,” risking serious harm or death. 432 That Ahlman opinion would
have declared that, notwithstanding the “special expertise and responsibility” of
nonjudicial actors, “even in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and
forgotten.” 433 That version of Ahlman would have changed the result for people
in the Orange County detention facility, and it would have set a very different
tone for pandemic judging.
That version of Ahlman is a counterfactual. Instead, the Supreme Court
called for no such intervention. Judges were part of a broader injustice that forced
those in America’s detention facilities to bear a staggering share of COVID-19
risk. Judges might have lacked the desire, imagination, or confidence to order
sufficiently health-protective remedies, but we will never know because they
were constrained by limited authority and bureaucratic resistance. As far as
health-protective detention practices go, judicial intervention is part of a much
larger process of institutional settlement across bureaucracies, between
administrative subordinates and leadership, and through multiple branches of
government. 434 Any entity within that ecosystem would struggle to produce
appropriate levels of health protection without concerted action from others.
Judges were no different, and perhaps they were uniquely disadvantaged.
What to do going forward? How will the institutional resistance captured
here affect how America vaccinates and otherwise protects the 2.3 million people
in detention? Before there can be any serious improvement, bureaucracies and
other nonjudicial institutions will have to treat pandemic risk differently than
other health-and-safety threats, developing statutes and regulations that permit
responsive action without cumbersome, individualized showings of health risk.
And American institutions will have to overcome their empirically dubious
resistance to decarceration. Judges must be willing and able to order more
discharge, issue orders requiring improved conditions notwithstanding the need
for complementary release, and assume receivership roles necessary to ensure
compliance with these judicial orders. We hope that many will learn lasting
432. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct 63, 66 (2020) (“They have
shown that their First Amendment claims are likely to prevail, that denying them relief would lead to
irreparable injury, and that granting relief would not harm the public interest.”).
433. Id. at 68.
434. See Dolovich, The Failed Regulation and Oversight of American Prisons, supra note 29
(manuscript at 5.2) (“In practice, when it comes to prisons, the checks and balances built into the system
have almost entirely failed, with no branch proving able or willing to ensure even minimally decent
carceral conditions.”).
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lessons from the largely indifferent and ineffectual judicial response to COVID19 at American detention sites, but we are dubious. Absent a broad social
commitment to more sweeping judicial remedies, the past will remain a sad
prologue.

